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Introduction
Daniel Schorr

In the aftermath of President Reagan's landslide
reelection, I became involved in a spirited exchange of correspondence with a television viewer because I had allowed to go
unchallenged a reference to the president as a "lame duck" by a
participant in my program. The writer asked me to apologize for
this unwarranted slur against a popular president. My explanation that "lame duck" was an unpejorptive description of an
officeholder who could not be reelected produced another angry
letter citing a Webster dictionary definition of "lame duck" as an
official serving out the remainder of a term after having been defeated. I was rescued by William Safire's Political Dictionary, a
manual of "the new language of politics," providing a more current definition of "lame duck" as "an office-holder whose power
is diminished because he is soon to leave office, as a result of defeat or statutory limitation" (italics very much mine).
This was an example of how the usage of words changes and
how much passion can be generated by how they are used in
politics. Indeed, words in politics are like emblen1s in wars and
revolutions-to be flown, shot at, and sometimes captured.
Word wars are not incidental but are central to political strifeespecially as amplified in this era by the great megaphone of
television.
As Democrats have appropriated the word "fair" (as in Fair
Deal), so Republicans have laid siege to "free" (as in "free enterprise"). The word "new" is contested, the Democrats having produced the New Deal of FDR days and the Republicans
counterattacking with New Federalism and, more recently, New
Opportunity.
No word has been flown more proudly, disputed more hotly
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and, finally, battered more decisively than "liberal." Its original
association with the simple word "free" (Latin liber) became lost
in antiquity as it became weighted with changing symbolism on
its voyage through time and across the ocean from Europe. As
might be expected, "liberal" carried a white-hat connotation
during the long generations when liberals dominated the political scene. When the conservatives finally swept in from the wilderness and stormed the bastions of government, they swiftly
attached black-hat connotations to the word. (My mail indicates
that to call the news media "liberal" has become an accusation,
needing no further detailed indictment.)
It is fascinating to look back on the vital role that liberalism has
played in· history. No single word, other than more general
expressions like "rights," "freedom," and "justice," has played
a more important role in America's political development. By
telling us what has happened to a word, Ronald Rotunda has
illuminated what has happened to America. It is done with meticulous regard for historical scholarship. Some day liberalism
may make a comeback, but for now this book will serve as its
epitaph.

The Politics of Language

Symbols in Politics and Law

Introduction
The ancients knew the importance of words.
Genesis tells us that after the Lord "fashioned all the wild beasts
and all the birds of heaven," the first order of priority was 'to
bring them to Adam, "to see what he would call them; each one
was to bear the name the man would give it. The man gave
names to all the cattle, all the birds of heaven, and all the wild
beasts." Naming things is important business.
This book is about naming things-about symbols and labels,
the importance of words, their power to manipulate, and why
people fight over them. In particular, it is a study of a specific
word, "liberal."
The liberal label has been a very significant symbol in modern
American political and legal history. And for most of this modern period, when we have spoken of liberal judges, the American liberal tradition, and liberal politicians, the adjective has
had favorable connotations. In fact, the late Senator Robert Taft,
as recently as 1950, argued that he was really liberal; he rejected
the conservative tag in favor of the word that then had more
favorable connotations.
In the 198os liberalism seems to be in disarray, and many politicians who formerly embraced the liberal label now want to
unpeel the tag. In 1964, when Barry Goldwater, an avowedly
conservative Republican candidate, ran against a self-described
liberal candidate, President Lyndon Johnson and his Great Society won a stunning victory. Yet only two decades later, the unabashedly conservative Ronald Reagan won an equally stunning
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reelection victory against the candidate of the liberals, Walter F.
Mondale.
Much had changed in twenty years. Actually, more had
changed than many people realize, for it is not generally remembered that "liberalism" is a relatively new term in American politics. The British liberals go back many years, but when the British Liberal party was in the ascendency in the early part of this
century, there were no American politicians who called themselves liberal. Not until Franklin D. Roosevelt battled Herbert
Hoover did the liberal label become important in the American
lexicon; then both Hoover and Roosevelt claimed to be the true
liberals, and the fight over the label dominated intellectual debate for much of the New Deal. Each politician sensed the favorable connotations of the word, and each tried to capture it.
Roosevelt won, and since then the word has been used to
describe such diverse groups as certain types of politicians,
judges, and theologians.
The fascinating story of the rise and decline of the liberal label
is not just a study in intellectual history; it is also a story of the
importance of the use of symbols generally-how they reflect
and mold the way we think and act. And it is the story of the
limits on the power and use of symbols.

The Importance of Symbols
The "symbols of government" 1 are of fundamental importance in the study of politics and law. Perhaps
because we have passed 1984 unscathed, we often ignore the
significance of George Orwell's Newspeak. But governments
know better. For example, in the large ancient governmentsAlexander's empire, the Seleucids' monarchy, and the Roman
empire-political, legal, and religious symbols generated loyalty. Sheldin Wolin has observed that "the use of symbolism was
particularly important because it showed how valuable symbols
can be in bridging vast distances. They serve to evoke the presence of authority despite the physical reality being far removed." 2
In the Middle Ages as well, leaders turned to symbols, sometimes ancient ones, to justify their rule. 3
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Symbols are still useful for generating loyalty in more modern
governments. Professor Murray Edelman has astutely noted that
"the most conspicuously democratic institutions are largely
symbolic and expressive in function." 4 The English historian
Walter Bagehot dem.onstrated how important the symbols of the
monarch and the constitution are for the British. Justice Frankfurter recognized that the state must use symbols to inculcate indispensable feelings toward government because "symbolism is
inescapable. Even the most sophisticated live by symbols." 5
A symbol can carry great significance for an individual. That
symbol becomes particularly significant whenever it has special meaning for a large number of people. Although there are
those who belittle argument over mere words, one should realize that words are seldom innocuous, for they are our primary
form of communication. Crucial concepts often lie in shades of
meaning.
The disagreement in the late 196os over the phrase "black
power" was, in many respects, an argument over definition. In
one Senate subcommittee hearing, for example, Senator Abraham Ribicoff warned Floyd McKissick, head of CORE and a black
power advocate, "You make our job very hard when you put us
up against such a slogan." McKissick replied that the slogan
would not be changed. Senator Robert Kennedy then argued
that "if people can't meet your definition, you read them out."
McKissick retorted that he was not throwing anyone out of the
movement and that he believed "black power" would be accepted just as "Irish power" had been accepted. 6 Two little words
and what they represented split the civil-rights movement for a
time, creating increased advocacy in some quarters and making
new enemies out of former friends in others.
Symbols also enable leaders to give the appearance of action. It
is very advantageous for leaders, especially in our democratic
society, to be able at least to appear to be taking action. People
like to think that something is being done about their problems;
for short-range popularity it does not make much difference if
something is actually done. Much of the history of antitrust legislation provides a beautiful example of the power of symbols to
substitute for substance.
In 1890, under popular pressure, Congress passed a vague law
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against monopolies. The purpose of this Sherman Antitrust Act,
a senator at that time said, was to pass "some bill headed: 'A bill
to Punish Trusts' with which to go to the country." 7 Later, in
1914, Congress passed the Clayton Antitrust Act, hailed as "Labor's Magna Carta" by Samuel Gompers, since he thought the
bill exempted labor from antitrust laws. In fact the Clayton Act,
for much of its history, was used more effectively against labor
than against capital. 8 Thurmond Arnold, in The Folklore of Capitalism, saw very clearly that symbolic legislation against the
trusts convinced the average citizen that action had been taken.
It did not matter that for the first forty years of this century the
laws had few teeth in them, that the controls that existed were
often not used, and that the courts generally interpreted laws to
favor the trusts whenever possible. Average people were not
apathetic toward the problem; they honestly thought that this
problem was solved. 9
Yet another reason why symbols of government are important
is that they reflect people's ideas, their perceptions of the world,
and sometimes their innermost thoughts. Keith Baird, for example, a Barbados-born high school teacher from Brooklyn, revealed his perception of the civil-rights struggle through his use
of symbols. When Baird introduced a resolution at the national
meeting of the American Federation of Teachers in 1966 urging a
campaign to substitute the term "Afro-American" for "Negro,"
he showed clearly his perception of the civil rights movement;
he argued that "it was high time that Negroes moved up to hyphenated status such as the Italian-Americans and other minority groups." "Negro" to him had historically been used" 'solely
to describe the enslaved and the enslavable."' 10
Historically there was nothing inherently distasteful about the
word "Negro." It had no pejorative connotations. Neither is it
generally recognized that there is a high status in being a hyphenated American. Further, if Negroes had been called AfroAmericans for two hundred years, Baird might well be arguing
today that we should substitute the word "Negro." Baird's resolution, however, did reveal his attitudes toward civil rights and
his profound disturbance by all aspects of racism and bigotry.
And so today, because of the urgings of modern civil rights leaders, "Negro" is typically replaced by the term "black."
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George Kennan, in trying to determine the perception of
Asians toward the world, depended on an analysis of their political symbols. His conclusion-that Asians are less fearful of
communism than we would like them to be-is founded on two
arguments. First, he says, "the power of these various semantic
symbols [communism, imperialism, and colonialism] is entirely
different in Asia than it is in Europe." The Asians fear imperialism and colonialism, which they have fought against for two
hundred years, more than they fear communism. Second,
Asians are not conscious of losing "freedom" under communism. There is no freedom as we know it in many Asian and African countries today. The "Chinese language has only one word
which remotely resembles our word 'freedom,' and that conveys
the sense of license and rather turbulent indiscipline." 11
It is no wonder that Lasswell wrote, "It is apparent that change
in the spread and frequency of exposure to key signs is an exceedingly significant indicator of important social processes. We
can follow the dissemination of secular or sacred cults by surveying trends in the geographical distribution of icons and other
significant signs found in the whole complex. Similarly, we can
establish the presumption of integrative or disintegrative trends
within any society by observing sign frequencies." 12
Although symbols are significant because people instinctively
believe that they are important, because they can substitute for
political action, and because they reflect people's innermost
thoughts and ideas, symbols are also important because they determine the very way people think. Symbols not only reflect;
they mold.
As trial lawyer$ have known for years, how a person asks a
question can predetermine the answer he or she receives. 13 Appropriate words and symbols can determine not only the answer
to a question, but also the way people think and the way they are
able to ask their questions. For example, at the Unification Congress of July-August 1903, V. I. Lenin was able to adopt a new
name for his caucus. Out of dissatisfaction with the proceedings
the Bund withdrew, leaving Lenin with a small majority. The
name Lenin adopted then was Bolshinstvo ("Majority") or Bolsheviki ("Majorityites").
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Though but yesterday . . . he had been in a minority, and,
more often than not would be in the minority in the future,
he would never relinquish the psychological advantage of that
name. A name, he knew, was a program, a distilled essence,
more powerful in its impact upon the untutored mind than
any propaganda slogan. What pride it could give to his caucus. No matter how it might dwindle, always to call itself
"Majorityites." What conviction, what an air of legality, of
democratic majority sanction, it would give in appealing to
the rank and file and the non-party masses. If he had remained in a minority, he would have chosen some other
banner name-like "True Iskrists" or "Orthodox Marxists"
or "Revolutionary Wing of the Russian Social Democracy."
But it is characteristic of the ineptness of his opponents that
they permanently accepted the designation of Mensheviki
(Minorityites) for their group [emphasis added]. 14
In Russia, as in the United States, it is important to join the
"bandwagon" or the "wave of the future." Lenin, by preempting
the label Majorityites, determined the perceptions of his audience so that they thought of Lenin's caucus as having majority
sanction.
It was no accident that during the Vietnam War, the administration labeled American bombing raids into North Vietnam
"protective retaliation" raids. A verb such as "to protect" has
more favorable connotations than the more blunt, "to bomb."
The introduction of United States troops into Laos was an "incursion," a much more limiting-sounding word than the traditional term "invasion." A retreat became a "mobile maneuver,"
and thus lost some of the implications of defeat. As the term
"military advisors" began to acquire negative connotations, the
imagemakers relabeled them "delivery team auditors." 15 To murder an enemy spy became the more antiseptic-sounding, "toterminate with extreme prejudice." And defoliation was called the
more neutral "resources control program." 16 In 1968 the Army
Digest, quoting the Judge Advocate General's Office, insisted that
the fighting in Vietnam was an "international armed conflict,"
not a war. 17
More recently the opponents of sex discrimination have recog-
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nized that in order to change people's attitudes toward women
and their roles, it is necessary to change the words used: the
head of a committee is the "chairperson"; the secretary is no
longer a "girl." At first the change in words may be only symptomatic of the new attitudes toward sex discrimination. But the
purpose of the verbal play is to affect future attitudes toward sexual stereotyping.
Modern linguistic research supports this theory: language in
general and symbols in particular mold the manner in which
people think. People think and talk by using words, and even
when they think without using words but by using "ideas," language still structures their thoughts. Benjamin Whorf, after
studying the language patterns of Hopi (an American Indian
tongue) and some modern European languages-mainly English, French, and German-concluded that even very abstract
concepts like "time" and "matter" are "not given in substantially
the same form by experience to all men but depend on the
nature of the language or languages through which they have
been developed." 18 Another linguist, Edward Sapir, makes essentially the same observation: "Though language is not ordinarily thought of as of essential interest to the students of
social science, it powerfully conditions all our thinking about social problems and processes." 19

The Importance of the Symbol"Liberal"
Though all widespread symbols are important,
certain symbols, at various times, carry particular significance.
In fact, much of United States political history can be interpreted
as a rivalry for the possession of certain words. In the early days
of our Republic, the Hamiltonians-those in favor of a strong
national government-called themselves Federalists, though at
that time "federation" meant what "confederation" means today.
The "true federalists" found themselves at a tactical disadvantage : they were in the position of arguing against federalism because they had accepted the label Anti-Federalist. 20
Shortly after 18oo the value of the federal symbol declined.
The decline occurred partly because the debate was over; the fed-
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eral Constitution had been adopted, and few people advocated
its repeal. The term also lost value because it acquired bad connotations: the rigidity of the Federalist party associated its inflexibility with the term "federalist."
"Democracy" then became a useful symbol, because the next
issue on the agenda was the question of democracy. For example, in the post-Civil War Gilded Age, some argued that in a
true democracy the government, not big business, should make
the basic economic decisions, while the proponents of laissez
faire contended that their economic doctrines represented true
democracy. 21 Since virtually everyone in the United States now
believes in democracy and all Republicans and Democrats are
recognized to be true democrats, there is no longer any political
advantage in proclaiming oneself a democrat.
While democracy is no longer the basis for rivalry in this country, in the outside world democracy is not universally a matter of
faith. There, this word, together with socialism, communism,
and liberalism, "are the labels which sum up the basic terms of
the political contest of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,"
states Giovanni Sartori. 22 In the United States, however, democracy offers its holders no great advantage, since everyone holds
it. Socialism and communism are derogatory labels here, falling
as they do outside the American tradition. 23 The only modern
label of world importance that has also been important in this
country is liberal or liberalism.
As a case study, the word "liberal" represents an important
symbol to illustrate the use of political symbols and their rise
and decline, because it is a peculiarly powerful word. Although
liberalism has no precise meaning in this country, whenever
people have tried to give it meaning they have often included
themselves in the definition, or in the "true definition" 24-at
least until very recently, when "conservative" has become a
much more fashionable word. 25 Whatever its meaning, no one
wants to be considered illiberal in the United States. Adam Ulam
.claimed that everyone "in the West who is not a self-declared fascist lays claim to being a liberal of sorts and programs ranging
from extreme conservatism to communism are advocated in the
name of 'liberalism."' 26 Herbert Hoover, Franklin D. Roosevelt,
and Robert Taft, among many others, have all strongly claimed
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that they were liberals. 27 Hoover and Taft were as positive that
the New Deal did not represent liberalism as Roosevelt was certain that it did. Even as the term "conservative" has become
more popular, with. "liberal" in the decline, the new conservatives often call themselves libertarians.
Such respect for the power of this political symbol makes itself
clear "in the qualifying adjectives which those who attack 'liberals' usually take the trouble to use," says Charles Frankel. 28 Even
in 1958, when President Eisenhower was campaigning for the
very conservative William Knowland of California, Ike attacked
the "self-styled liberals . . . [with] the irresistible impulse . . . to
squander money-your money" (emphasis added). 29 Only the
self-styled liberals are under attack; the true liberals are, by implication, fine people. One commentator has elaborated on this
peculiar American habit of attacking only qualified liberals.
Southern Senators who are proud to be known as conservatives normally train their guns not on "liberals" but on
"Northern liberals." And they not infrequently add that
they are themselves as liberal as the next man in matters
of foreign policy or social welfare. Even the late Senator
McCarthy handled the word gingerly. His memorably modulated remarks were usually studded with the phrase nphony
liberals." This carried the convenient suggestion, to be sure,
that all liberals were phonies. But it also left the inference
open that he had nothing against genuine liberals, if he
could only find any. 30
Of course, the fact that "liberal" is a favorable political symbol in
the United States does not mean that a person is at an advantage
being labeled too liberal. For example, Spiro Agnew, while vicepresident, attacked the "radical liberals." 31 Extremism is a vice
and not a virtue for most Americans. But the unqualified symbol
"liberal" is recognized by many politicians to have some political
drawing power.
When we look at public opinion polls of the middle 196os,
when the liberal label was very popular, we can see that politicians were correct about the drawing power of liberalism. In
one poll of the 20,546 students enrolled on the campus of Michigan State University, 42 percent declared themselves to be Demo-
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crats or leaning in that direction, and 51 percent said they were
Republicans or leaning in that direction. Although this. sch~ol,
which is supposed to be a typical large midwestern uniVersity,
was more Republican than Democratic, 53 percent of the stu32
dents declared themselves to be very or moderately liberal.
Candidates who emphasize that they are liberal would have
more drawing power than those who try to draw merely Demo-

operate often as a cross-pressure against the very significant factor of party identification.

cratic votes.
An even earlier poll also demonstrated the drawing power of
the liberal symbol. After following area-sampling procedures;
interviewing 3,o68 respondents in California, Illinois, and New
Mexico; considering only voting data for the 1944, 1946, and 1948
elections; and allowing voters to classify themselves as libera~ or
conservative, the pollsters concluded, "Liberali~m-conserv~hsm
suggest at least a partial explanation of non-vohng and ~f dissatisfaction of respondents from their favored party. Thus It can be
inferred from our data that the liberal Republican and the conservative Democrat did not feel as much at home in their respective parties as did conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats, and they expressed their divergence by a smaller turno~t
at the polls and by voting less often for the candidates of theu

That most people now agree that Herbert
Hoover was not a liberal does not explain why he honestly called
himself a liberal until his death. And, even if we grant that
Franklin D. Roosevelt was a recognized liberal of the New Deal
days, what about other important figures of the New Deal? Were
they liberal? Is Walter Lippmann a liberal? Is Governor LaFollette
a liberal? Is Justice Black a liberal? Max Lerner says that we ask
these questions with "desperate amusement" because all these
men share in the liberal heritage and yet have important differences among themselves. 35 Alan P. Grimes, after considering the
very different men who have called themselves liberal, asks,
"Must we then despair of definition? Is a liberal nothing more
than any man who calls himself one? Or is called one?" 36 Grimes
answers "no" to this question and then tries to classify the concepts that form his definition of liberalism. Any such definition,
however, is by its nature normative and not descriptive; such a
definition excludes many people who claim to be liberal and
have convinced others that they are liberal.
For the purpose of this case study, I will use a very descriptive, functional, and operational definition: a person is a liberal
who can convince other people that he or she is a liberal. Given
this definition, which does not arbitrarily exclude anyone from
being labeled liberal, the immediate question one should ask is
why Roosevelt came to be identified as a liberal and Hoover did
not. Both were self-declared liberals. Given that both Hoover
and Roosevelt honestly considered themselves to be liberal, and
that "liberal" is a potent political symbol with which many politicians have wanted to identify, why is there now a general consensus that Hoover was no liberal? Why was it that Hoover was
so unsuccessful in capturing this word?
An immediate answer to such questions would probably

favored party." 33
•
•
These two older polls show another important pmnt, besides
the former drawing power of the liberal symbol: in spite of
the fact that many politicians of different beliefs claimed that
they were liberal, the average person, at least since. 19~4, generally agrees as to who is liberal. When the 1962 Michi?a~ Stat~
University Poll asked an open-ended question-who IS hberal.
who is conservative?-64 percent of the students picked Barry
Goldwater as a known conservative and 62 percent spontane34
ously said that John F. Kennedy was a known liberal. The se.cond poll, based on the elections of the late 1940s, stated t~at In
general those people who considered the~selves conservativewhether they were Democrats or Repubhcans-thought. the Republican party to be more their home than ~he Democratic party;
those who considered themselves to be hberal felt the Democratic party to be more their home. These findings are especially
important when we remember that the symbol "liberal" has to

A Case Study in the Use of the
Liberal Label
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assume that usage in the United States of the political symbol
"liberal" has generally followed British usage. Given this assumption, one could explain that British liberalism has, over the
years, changed its meaning, especially with L. T. Hobhouse's formulation of a new liberalism in 1911. 37 This new British liberalism tried to establish a middle course between socialism and classical liberalism. The new British welfare liberals, says Thomas P.
Neill, "insisted against the socialists that wealth was produced
by individual initiative, and they insisted against the individualists that the site value of real property depended almost entirely
on the community, that the right of ownership to even personal
property was meaningless without social approval and maintenance." 38 In line with this new liberalism, Winston Churchill,
while a member of the Liberal party, argued in 1908 that he
"should like to see the state undertaking new functions, stepping forward into new spheres of activity, particularly in services which are in the nature of monopolies." 39 These new English liberals still believed in liberty, but they also believed that
the right to a living wage was as important a liberty as the right
to property and personalliberty. 40 Further, they believed that the
state could pass laws to ensure the former without denying the
latter liberty. 41
Given this background, Herbert Hoover would have had to
overthrow a generation of opinion to persuade people to accept
his nineteenth-century laissez-faire definition of liberalism.
Hence, it was to be expected that he would fail to capture this
favorable political label.
However, this immediate answer makes a very important but
incorrect assumption: that the United States had followed English use of the political symbol"liberal"; that for thirty years the
great majority of Americans knew what "liberal" meant; and that
therefore Hoover and his conservative contemporaries tried to
steal this important symbol of the New Deal. Yet all available evidence suggests that "liberal" was not an important political symbol in the United States until the 1930s. This is not to say that
"liberal" was never used before the New Deal; rather, it was not
an important symbol before the New Deal. For the great majority
of Americans, the word "liberal'' was literally born in the early
New Deal.
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The term "liberal" was not a favorite American political label of
earlier eras. An examination of the political symbols used in some
early political literature demonstrates this fact. Herbert Croly's
book, The Promise of American Life, is certainly one of these
books. It, was first published in November 1909 and was reprinted in June 1910 and April 1911. Although at that time it
did not sell more than 7,500 copies, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.,
states that "it had immediate and extensive influence on what
historians have come to call the Progressive era." 42 To add to
Croly's liberal credentials, I should also point out that he
founded the New Republic. Yet, after analyzing the symbols used
in The Promise, Samuel H. Beer concluded: "Only occasionally
in this book ... he uses the term liberal or liberalism. No more
frequently he used conservatism-but in a formula that opposed it to radicalism. The term with which he, like his hero
Theodore Roosevelt, identified himself and his views, was, of
course, 'progressivism.'" 43
Croly's infrequent use of the term "liberal" is made even more
dramatic if we briefly compare the Democratic Roosevelt's use of
the term. In the first volume of Roosevelt's public papers, representing the years 1928 to 1932, there are no references to "liberalism" in the index. Yet a few years later we find that FOR titles
Volume 7, representing the year 1938, The Continuing Struggle for
Liberalism. 44 A dramatic shift had taken place in FOR's vocabulary-a shift that was not foreseen in the political terminology of
Croly's The Promise.
In the pre-Croly era, in the eighteenth century, Beer observes
that "generic terms-such as 'democratic' -are used in addition
to party labels to designate important viewpoints. But 'liberal' is
not among them." 45 One cannot argue that "liberal" was never
used but rather that in quantitative terms this symbol was insignificant. A review of political symbols in popular magazines 46
and newspapers 47 also demonstrates that the increased use of
the liberal label coincided with the New Deal.
Some of the more important figures of the early New Deal also
recall that it was during this period that the word "liberal" became an important political symbol. Raymond Moley writes that
on March 8, 1933, he prepared Roosevelt's message that went to
Congress on March 10. In this speech Moley remembers using
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the expression "liberal." 48 "The word 'liberal' in its present
meaning was then only beginning to supplant the old word 'progressive."' 49 Arthur Krock of the New York Times, also a very politically aware actor of the New Deal era, says that he agrees with
Moley that around 1933 "liberalism" started to replace "progressivism." 50 A very influential brain-truster, Rexford G. Tugwell,
also remembers that "liberalism" emerged as an important
political symbol in the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. 51
Tugwell, in fact, describes the New Deal as "a time of confusion,
of trying to attain collectivistic organization under individualistic labels." 52
Not until the early 1930s did "liberal" become a very important
political symbol. This symbol had been used before in American
history, but never in any significant way. Then suddenly politicians, publicists, and articulate people in general began expressing themselves and thinking in terms of this new label. In
the 1930s there was a great debate in America over whether
Hoover or FDR properly owned the symbol. Even long after the
New Deal, the very conservative John T. Flynn, refusing to admit
defeat, pleaded in Hoover-like language for the Hoover-like argument that "the Communist, the fascist and the planner, who
is really a fascist,· have reversed all this. [Previously, the central
state was the enemy of liberalism.] They propose to make the
State more powerful than ever with its arsenal of economic
weapons. They call this the dream of liberalism. I say they have

stolen a grand old word and are running amuck with their plundered
property" (emphasis added). 53
The symbol "liberal" is especially important for the New Deal
period because, as it emerged, it seemed to represent something
new. The new symbol implied new action. Second, the new
symbol and the debate it caused reflected the intellectual turmoil
of a nation trying to decide whether to accept or reject a new
deal in politics. Third, this new symbol, unlike a geographical
term, allowed people to think in terms of classes, not sections of
the country-that is, to think in liberal-conservative terms and
not in northern-southern terms. Finally, this symbol was especially important for people who lived at the time of the New Deal
because they thought that the debate over who owned the new
liberal label was an important debate. In fact, by 1936 the editors
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of the New York Times, reflecting public concern, could write that
the fight for the liberal label "is coming forward as an issue in the
national campaign. Both New Deal and anti-administration
spokesmen declare their devotion to the liberal ideal of freedom
and democracy; both assail each other as opponents of true
liberalism." 54
We may grant that symbols are important; that the syml;>ol "liberal" is especially important in the United States; and that by the
end of the 1930s "liberal" had become a viable symbol used to
identify New Deal programs. Yet the birth and maturation of the
liberal label raises more difficult questions. How and why did
this political symbol gain such wide usage in the United States in
such a short period of time? Why did this symbol remain viable
when others such as New Freedom, New Deal, Normalcy, and
more recent ones such as Fair Deal and New Frontier are now
anachronistic? Did FDR choose the symbol "liberal" to designate
his programs? How consciously did he make this choice? If FDR
did choose the symbol, why did he choose it and not some other
symbol such as "progressive"? How was Roosevelt able to convince the public that he, and not Hoover, was the "true liberal"?
In the period during which both Hoover and Roosevelt claimed
that they were each liberal, how confused was the public? And
why, in more recent times, did the liberal label decline in importance, as more politicians unabashedly began to call themselves
conservative?
This study seeks to determine how and why this viable political symbol emerged, what the public's attitude was toward it, and
how powerful this symbol was at the time of the New Deal. Why
did this symbol rise in importance, and why did it decline? After
studying the British analogy, the American background until the
debate of the 1930s, the great debate itself, and post-1940 attitudes toward liberalism, we should be in a much better position
to determine the answers to these questions. These conclusions
should then enable us to understand the importance and usefulness, in the legal and political arenas, of symbols generally.
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The British Analogy

The Emergence of Liberalism in England
Giovanni Sartori correctly observes that "while
the thing liberalism has been-according to Harold Laski, an unimpeachable witness-the outstanding doctrine of the West for
four centuries, the word is much more recent." 1 Liberalism was
conceived in 1811 when a group of Spaniards proposed the adoption of a new constitution based on the French constitution of
1781, which in turn was based on the radical thought of les philosophes. The proponents of this radical constitution called themselves Liberales, and because the origins of the Liberales were in
the Enlightenment, their thought included anticlericalism as an
essential ingredient from the very beginning. 2
The Liberales became even more anticlerical in their debate over
the new constitution with the monarchists and the clerical and
lay supporters of the Catholic church; these opponents of the
Liberales condemned the constitution as an unworkable document based on false theological and philosophical assumptions. 3
While the Spanish right wing was certainly not admirable, one
could hardly consider these new Spanish Liberales paragons of
virtue, either. Thomas P. Neill has called their philosophy "doctrinaire, as only the Spanish can be doctrinaire; arbitrary, and,
paradoxically, quite illiberal." 4
From Spain the term "liberal" traveled to Italy, appearing as
liberalismo, and to France, as liberalisme, where it was used to describe certain local political beliefs. 5 It is important to realize that
in each case the new label was being applied to beliefs that
already existed. The term "liberalism" came after the thing liberalism had been born and-since the word followed the fact-

there was no necessity for any ideological similarities in the
different countries' use of the term. In some countries-for example, Germany-"people began to speak of 'liberalism' when
they had ceased, or were ceasing, to be liberal." 6 Although it
turned out that liberalism in the Latin countries generally implied anticlericalism, there was nothing in the label "liberal" that
required this relationship to exist. In fact, although English liberalism had some theological implications, it was not really anticlerical; its concerns were primarily economic and secondarily
political. 7
The manner in which the term "liberalism" took root in England from the Continent is especially instructive. From 1811 to
1830 the term "liberalism" had been traveling around the Continent acquiring connotations of revolution, anticlericalism, arbitrariness-in short, what Americans today would generally
call extremism. Then, around 1830, the left wing of the Whig
party combined with Radicals and businessmen to campaign for
what was to become the Reform Bill of 1832, a proposal to extend
the franchise to include the business class and to redistrict the
country in order to give the growing industrial centers a fairer
representation. 8 Macaulay called it "this second Bill of Rights,
this Greatest Charter of the Liberties of England," but the landowners did not favor a second Magna Carta that would reduce
the powers that they had obtained from the first one.
It is difficult for us now-in an age where even the most totalitarian regimes pay lip service to democracy-to appreciate exactly how worried the landed gentry really was. Their worry
turned to outright fear when Daniel O'Connell suggested carrying the proposed reform even further, to include a secret ballot
and universal male suffrage. The Annual Register attacked his
idea as being based on the "simple, but mad proposition, that
every man who pays a tax, or is liable to serve in the militia, is
entitled to have a voice in the representation." 9 The Annual Register should not have been so frightened, because the left-wing
Whigs and the businessmen believed that only the middle class
with sufficient property should have the vote. However, under
either the Reform Bill of 1832 or O'Connell's proposed amendment to that reform, the landowners would lose considerable
power, and they opposed the reform vehemently. 10
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As one method of opposing the reform, the landed gentry
and their representatives in Parliament, the Tories, decided to
achieve what they thought would be the strategic advantage of
calling their opponents "liberals," thereby (the Tories hoped)
identifying them with the "un-English" revolutionaries of the
Continent. 11 "Liberal" in England, then, was first applied with
the intention of being a derogatory term.
But "liberal" seemed to be a word with inherently good implications. In England, since before 16oo, the adjective "liberal"
has meant "free from prejudice or orthodox zeal." 12 "Liberal"
implies "liberality" and "liberty"; all these words are derived
from the same Latin word: liber, meaning "free."
In another era, the Roman government had found liberalitasmeaning "liberality" -a very good symbol to place on their
coins as a method of winning and retaining political support
from the people. 13 As Thomas P. Neill correctly observes, "'Liberty' is a beautiful word in any language. Its connotations have
always been appealing, noble, high-minded .... The adjective
'liberal' imputes loftiness of view, concern with the things of the
spirit, a respect for human decency. 'Illiberal,' on the other
hand, is a word of ugly connotations. It implies smallness of
soul, pettiness of outlook, selfishness of nature. Everyone, then,
wants to be considered liberal in this sense." 14
"Liberal" was a particularly favorable symbol for the advanced
Whigs because of the moment at which it was introduced. Over
the entire Continent there was agitation for reform. The word
captured this drift of modern history, for it implied liberty, removal of restraint, and progress. 15 In nineteenth-century England, "liberal" was an advantageous word to use for political
purposes. The advanced Whigs did exactly that; because the
adjective "liberal" had such laudatory implications in Englandregardless of Continental ferment-they readily accepted the
so-called un-English, foreign label "liberal." 16
The opponents of the new liberal wing of the Whig party were
at an obvious disadvantage. Not only did their plan to attach the
term "liberal" to the advanced Whigs as a derogatory label backfire, but their own appellation, "Tory," was considered a reproachful designation at that time. Then J. W. Croker, in an article dated January 1, 1830, used a new label: "conservative." He
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used this term in a political sense, meaning the maintenance of
existing political and ecclesiastical institutions. Many Tories
who had disapproved of old Tory reaction immediately began
showing preference for the new term, "conservative." 17
The new liberals thought that "conservative" was not as proper
a word for their opponents as the pejorative "Tory," so at first the
liberals ridiculed this new label. 18 However, at that time .there
was a shift not only in party names but also in party principles.
The liberal Whigs, fighting for the middle class rather than the
farmers or laborers, began to draw support from many Tories
who were manufacturers or members of the educated middle
class. For a while there were three major groups in Parliament:
the Tories, the Whigs, and the Liberals. "The traditional parliamentary system seemed unable to admit by the side of the Whig
and Tory parties a third not reducible to either," says Guido De
Ruggiero. "But in time the more active and vital mentality of the
free trade party drew the antiquated Liberalism of the Whigs
into its own orbit and so restored the old two-party system,
though giving its form a new content." 19 The old content was a
contest between two parties, both of which were based on a
single aristocratic tradition, and both of which were grounded in
the same privileges of birth. The new content was politics based
on class interest. 20 And so the new division in Parliament was no
longer Whig/Tory but instead Liberal/Conservative. 21
Because the new party names reflected a fundamental change
in political substance, they proved durable. Since the new Liberals represented different policies and drew their support from
the middle class-because, in short, they were not really Whigsit made sense for people to call them liberal. And since the new
Conservatives were more than just Tories, this label also proved
lasting, even though the Liberals argued that the new Conservatives should continue to be called Tories.
The Conservatives in England had lost the chance to be called
liberal. Though they tried often to become associated with the
word, 22 it became the name of a politically distinct party, the Liberal party. Hence, in England the political label could have a
fairly precise meaning; "liberal" was not so vague an appellation
that many different people of different parties could attach themselves to it.
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The Elements of English Liberalism
and the Seeds of Change
That "liberalism" was attached to one of England's two major parties and thus had a fairly specific political
meaning did not imply that the definition of liberalism could not
change. There were three basic elements of classical liberalism
that contained within themselves the seeds of welfare liberalism: the Radical element, the economic element, and the religious element. 23
The primary representative of Radical thought was Jeremy
Bentham. Bentham was extremely efficient, extremely individualistic, extremely rationalistic, and extremely cold. It was said of
him that he "sinned against the imagination." Ruggiero states,
"All law is to him an evil, because an infraction of the liberty of
the individual; and, in general, every function of government is
an evil." 24
Bentham believed that society is in harmony when people act
according to their self-interest. However, sometimes individuals
do not follow their self-interest. Hence, government is justified in
passing laws to prevent them from following a false self-interest
and thus infringing on another's liberty. But there is no such
thing as natural law; rather, all law is made by government and
all law properly "draws its inspiration from the interest of the
greatest number, as against a narrowly selfish interest falsely so
called." 25
Bentham's principle was readily adopted by the bourgeoisie,
who used it against the selfishness of the landowning class. The
manufacturers were not the only ones, however, who could use
Bentham's principles. Although radicalism was in part a liberal,
middle-class philosophy, in the sense that the self-interest principle meant individualism and protection of individual liberties,
radicalism could also be democratic, since the happiness of the
greatest number was the justification of laws. Also within
Bentham's philosophy was the seed of welfare and socialism: if
the workers received the franchise, the state -in the name of the
greatest-happiness principle and uninhibited by thoughts of
natural property rights-could be very socialistic. 26
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We can more easily see the capacity for welfare liberalism and
even socialism in Bentham's principles if we quickly turn to John
Ruskin's Unto This Last, one of the most influential books for
British politics at the turn of the century. According to John D.
Rosenburg, "Clement Attlee, who became a socialist after reading the works of Ruskin and William Morris, wrote that the
modern Labour Party was born in 1906, when twenty-nine independent Labourites were returned to the House of Commons;
according to a questionnaire circulated among them, the book
which most profoundly influenced their thoughts was Unto This
Last." 27 Yet the same author who was so influential with the first
members of England's great socialist party was able to argue consistently that the political economy should strive for "the greatest number of human beings noble and happy." 28
The second major element of classical liberalism that had
within it this germ of welfare liberalism was the philosophy of
the Economists. The Economists were related to the Benthamite
Radicals, but they were also descendants of Adam Smith. Smith's
followers believed in homo oeconomicus but then kept him in a laboratory. Economic Man was not sent "into the streets like a man of
flesh and blood to make laws for his fellow men." 29 The second
important distinction between the Radicals and the Economists
was that these descendants of Adam Smith did not believe in
natural harmony if all people would follow their self-interest. Instead they believed in inevitable conflict in society.
Malthus voiced one aspect of this conflict in his Essay on Population. A large population, he declared, is not always good. He
thought that the increase in population was much faster than the
proportional increase in production of food from land. The
group responsible for the misery caused by the overproduction
of people was the laboring class. He seemed to be saying to the
workers, "Your ... lack of self-control has led you to multiply to
the point of murderous mutual competition." 30 Ricardo took
Malthus's argument one step further. His villain was not the proletariat but the landowner. More land would have to be farmed
as the population increased. Also, since some lands were more
fertile than others, the more fertile lands would increase in value
as the population grew. The few landowners who had the good
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fortune to own these more fertile lands would become wealthy
merely by waiting; such landowners would grow richer without
working any harder.
The industrial bourgeoisie used Ricardo's theory to show that
not they but the landowners were the selfish members of society
responsible for the workers' misery. Yet this argument of the
business interests still had within it the seeds of welfare: if the
land's value is created by society, then society should obviously
own the land. Expropriate the villains! Says De Ruggiero, "The
working man soon ... quoted Ricardo against Ricardo." 31
The American Henry George was one major figure who used
Ricardo's argument to justify exclusive state possession of rent.
George believed that Ricardo's law of rent was a "geometric
axiom." He argued that rent, because it increases faster than
the productive power of labor and capital, forces down wages
and interest, thereby causing depressions and more poverty.
George's simple solution to the problem was to have the state
appropriate rent. With the continually increasing revenues from
the single tax on land, the state could operate a whole new set of
programs. He predicted, "We would reach the ideal of the socialist but not through government repression. Government would
become the administration of a great co-operative society." 32
The third major element of classical liberalism that had within
it the seeds of change was the religious one. Religious Nonconformity, Gladstone had said, was "the backbone of British
Liberalism." Individual initiative, competition, and the spirit of
Calvinism were in each of the Nonconformist sects. Their organization was congregational and their members were, in the
main, drawn from the middle class and the elite of the working
class. 33 These revived Nonconformist sects served to make radicalism more humane. The homo oeconomicus and the Good Samaritan became bedfellows. Parallel to Nonconformity, which
was inspired by Methodism, was the Evangelical movement,
which worked within the Church of England and produced
many of the same moral and social results of Methodism.
The result of these religious developments, said John Dewey,
was that there was a general humanitarian movement "instigated by religion [that] was active in attack upon slavery, upon
the abuses of prison life, upon brutal and mechanical methods

f administering charity, and through the factory laws, upon the
conditions of labor of women and children in mines
and factories. In every one of these movements evangelical zeal
was the motive force." 34 This humanitarian zeal was, of course,
the seed of a new liberalism.
By the end of the 186os, the Classical Liberal party h~d oposed the Crimean War, eventually favored the North 1n the
~merican Civil War (because the liberals saw the North fighting
against slavery), cut government budgets, ins~ituted d~rec~ taxes,
encouraged more independence of the colon1es-wh1ch 1n turn
paved the way for a Commonwealth-and encourage~ religi?us
freedom. But the Liberal party as yet had no education pohcy;
they opposed the Factory Acts and state protection for workers;
and they had a pedantic reverence for freedom of contract which
operated greatly to the advantage of the owners of the means of
. 35
pro d uctlon.

~nhuman

The Seeds of the New Liberalism
Grow, Mature, and Wither
As we have seen, the liberal label had a fairly
precise meaning in England because it was associated with a
definite political party. Yet this fairly precise meaning was able to
develop because the doctrine of liberalism had within it the
seeds of change. Simply because seeds are planted, however,
does not assure that they will grow; there must be an appropriate climate. England after around 1870 supplied that climate.
One of the most important climatic changes was the different
attitude of the workers. Many liberals had argued that poverty is
incurable. However, since industrialized England was quite
prosperous, it became increasingly difficult to convince the poor
that their poverty was natural. Many argued that "if 'natural
laws' of economics condemned them to poverty in a prosperous
milieu, then it was time to adopt a system with different laws of
operation." 36 The workers took the three major elements of classical liberalism outlined in the previous section and carried the
arguments within them to their logical conclusion.
The workers also adopted and developed the other arguments
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?f cl~s.si~al liberalism:

the majority rule and universal suffrage
ImphCit In extending the franchise; emphasizing the freedom
of their jobs more than the freedom of trade; the individual liberty to organize politically and economically as workers. They
wanted economic progress, but by progress they meant humankind's collective control over economic life. 37
What the workers thought was now more important because
they had the vote. The Conservatives had advocated labor legis:lation and a widened franchise in order to capture the labor vote,
which they proceeded to do for a time. Hence, after the second
electoral reform of 1867, the Conservatives were able to defeat
Gladstone's cabinet in 1874. 38 The Conservatives' more benevolent attitude pressured the Liberals to change, in order to be able
to recapture power. In 1884 it was the Liberal government that
tried to win labor's votes by extending the suffrage to rural workers, thus making adult male suffrage almost universal. 39
Not only were the workers' attitudes changing, but the liberals' attitudes were also changing, a shift prompted in part by the
need to win workers' votes. Another reason for the change was
simply that the society of small capitalists that the liberal philosophy postulated no longer existed. In response to the new
large corporations, unions grew up. 40 Eventually liberals began
to realize that unions were an appropriate form of organization
because they were spontaneous bodies of free workers and be~ause they enabled workers to compete on equal terms. 41 Many
hberals also began to realize that because of the growing complexities of society-education, public works, banking activities, railways, and shipping companies-all these activities were
taking on the functions of public services and therefore should
be regulated, controlled, or owned by the state. 42 Since the time
of Bentham, liberals had used the legislature to enact reform;
thus many liberals were not shocked when they found themselves using the legislature in a positive manner. 43
We can most easily see this dramatic shift in the meaning of
"liberal" if we look briefly at the effects of that shift in John
Stuart Mill. Mill was at first the loyal follower of Bentham. He
wrote Utilitarianism primarily to defend Bentham's "greatest
happiness principle," and in the course of that defense he modified that doctrine in order to make it more powerful. Yet this
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same Mill could write, by the end of his life, that even if he
would suddenly achieve all the changes in institutions and opinions that his utilitarian philosophy desired, he would still not be
happy.
After utilitarianism gave him a mental crisis, Mill decided to
abandon that cold philosophy of the radicals: "If I am asked,
what system of political philosophy I substituted for that which,
as a philosophy, I had abandoned, I answer, No system: only a
conviction that the true system was something much more complex and many-sided than I had previously had any idea of." 44
This same Mill also surprisingly concluded, "If the choice were
to be made between communism with all its chances, and the
present state of society with all its sufferings and injustices, if
this, or communism, were the alternative, all the difficulties
great or small of communism would be as dust in the balance." 45
In short, liberalism was changing. The philosophy that was
adequate in the first half of the nineteenth century in England
was no longer tolerable in the second half. The major philosophers of liberalism, exemplified by J. S. Mill, changed their beliefs in response to the new situation, and the seeds of change
thrived in the new climate.
Old classical liberalism was poured out of the bottle and welfare liberalism was poured in; but although the contents were
new, the label"liberalism" was not changed. Since welfare liberalism grew out of basic elements of classical liberalism, it seemed
reasonable to many that the same label would be used to describe both philosophies.
However reasonable the retention of the old label was, we
must remember that liberalism had already shown itself to be a
very important symbol for members of a political party to use.
Therefore we would expect that those proponents of classical liberalism would object to the capture of this symbol by the advocates of a welfare state. They did indeed object.
The major representative of the Manchester liberals, who did
not want to lose their liberal label, was Herbert Spencer. Spencer
was such a great believer in laissez faire that he even wanted private enterprise to run the highway and sewer systems. Spencer
agreed that quack doctors could cause the loss of life, but to use
the state to forbid them to practice "is directly to violate the
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moral law." 46 This very inflexible classical liberal strongly objected in 1884 that the new so-called liberalism was in reality a
kind of Toryism, since it had given up the idea of the freedom of
contract and voluntary cooperation that distinguished it from a
"coercive military organization." 47 To protect their label from
misuse, says Thomas P. Neill, Spencer and the other Manchester
liberals formed "the Liberty and Property Defense League,
much like the American Liberty League of 1934, that set forth on
a crusade to defend liberty and property from the attacks of the
new 'welfare' liberalism .... Each group laid claim to the title
liberalism and accused the other of 'spurious liberalism' or
'blind conservatism.'" 48
There were two major reasons why Spencer failed to recapture
the liberal label. First, it was quite logical for the welfare liberals
to be called liberal, since their beliefs about welfare grew out of
the elements of classical liberalism. Second, "liberal" had been
historically associated in England with the name of a political
party. When the new liberals won control of the party, they won
control of the label. Those who clung to the tenets of laissez faire
were simply read out of the party. The protesters were called
"conservative." 49
The new welfare liberalism developed and eventually stood
for. a whole period of social progress. For example, before World
War I there was a burst of social reform under the CampbellBannerman and Asquith governments that was "in many ways
like the New Deal and in fact providing specific models for some
of its legislation." 50 By the second decade of this century, the
transition to this new liberalism was complete. It was now a
fairly mature doctrine. The welfare liberals in general saw themselves as beyond the era of the Manchester school. In political
beliefs they saw themselves as between the Tories and the Socialists. They were the middle road.
Hobhouse explained how the new liberalism went beyond the
beliefs of laissez faire: "If we grant . . . that it is demanded of all
sane adult men and women that they should live as civilized beings, as industrious workers, as good parents, as orderly and
efficient citizens, it is, on the other side, the function of the economic organization of society to secure them the material means
of living such a life ... and if they are not secure without the
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deliberate action of the state, they must be secured by the deliberate action of the state." 51 Liberalism also distinguished itself
from Toryism; as Chamberlain explained, the Tories allowed intervention because of "patronage" while the Liberals intervened
because they believed "all people shall be assisted to govern
themselves." 52
The new liberalism was also distinct from socialism because,
as Churchill explained in 1908, "Socialism seeks to put down
wealth; Liberalism would preserve private interests in the only
way in which they can be safely and justly preserved, namely, by
reconciling them with public right. Socialism would kill enterprise; Liberalism would rescue enterprise from the trammels of
privilege and preference. Socialism assails the pre-eminence of
the individual; Liberalism seeks, and shall seek more in the future, to build up a minimum standard for the mass. Socialism
exalts the rule; Liberalism exalts the man. Socialism attacks capital; Liberalism attacks monopoly." 53
Meanwhile the Labour party had been formed in 1891 and
rapidly made progress. 54 The workers understood Churchill's
distinction between socialism and liberalism, and they chose socialism. Although when "liberal" was first introduced into England it proved itself to be an advantageous political symbol, by
the 1920s the word had lost some of its natural power because it
was so connected with the Liberal party. The word had come to
be the party platform. When the voters rejected the platform,
they rejected the symbol that stood for the platform. By the time
the New Deal was appearing in America, the electoral support of
the Liberal party in England was withering.
John Maynard Keynes tried to bring new life into the Liberal
party. In the late 1920s and in the early 1930s he was proposing
new policies that the Liberal party should adopt. Though these
policies failed to resurrect the Liberal party in Britain, it is of interest to consider Keynes's pleas. He argued that he could never
bring himself to be a Conservative because "they offer me ...
neither intellectual nor spiritual consolation." What some Conservatives stood for "promotes neither my self-interest or the
public good." Neither could he become a member of the Labour
party because it was a class party, "and the class is not my class.
. . . The Class war will find me on the side of the educated bour-
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geoisie." 55 By the process of elimination, "the Liberal Party is still
the best instrument of future progress-if only it had strong
leadership and the right programme." 56
An important part of this right program was of course the economic program. Keynes warned his contemporaries: "The transition from economic anarchy to a regime which deliberately
aims at controlling and directing economic forces in the interests
of social justice and social stability, will present enormous difficulties both technical and political. I suggest, nevertheless, that
the true destiny of New Liberalism is to seek their solution." 57
Keynes saw the Liberal party as the true middle ground for
controlling economic forces. On the one side of it was fascism
and on the other bolshevism. Socialism and conservatism offered no middle course: "Just as the Conservative Party will always have its Die-Hard wing, so the Labour Party will be always
flanked by the Party of Catastrophe-Jacobins, Communists,
Bolshevists, whatever you choose to call them." Keynes placed
his hopes with the Liberal party, "the home of Economic Individualism and Social Liberty." 58

Lessons from English History
This brief analysis of the history of the political
term "liberal" in England enables us to draw some important
conclusions for the study of the American symbol "liberal." In
the first place, "liberal" -even before it had a chance to acquire a
political meaning-had shown itself to have inherently good
connotations in the English language. Even when, in 1830, the
symbol was used in a derogatory sense, the naturally favorable
connotations of the word easily triumphed over the pejorative
foreign implications. Since both the British and Americans
speak the same language, we can assume that "liberal" by itself-that is, at the introduction of the political symbol, before it
has had a chance to acquire historical connotations through
years of use-is also a very favorable word for a politician to
capture.
The word in England also showed itself to be a fairly durable
political symbol. Its permanence can be attributed to the fact that
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the introduction of "liberal" and "conservative" were accomanied by policy changes and the introduction of class politics.
~ecause the new labels stood for something new, they became
fairly permanent and would not easily become anachronistic.
In addition, the label "liberal" in England had had a fairly precise political meaning, because it was the actual name of a party.
When the party carried the liberal doctrine to its logicaLconclusion and adopted a welfare program, the party also carried with
it the label "liberal." Spencer's objections proved futile partly because the new liberalism grew out of the old; to apply the same
name to both philosophies was logical. Spencer also failed to
prevent the shift in the meaning of "liberal" because the New
Liberals won control of the party, legitimating the capture of the
symbol. In the United States, because no major party is called
the Liberal party, we would expect the label "liberal" to be much
more vague. Since there is no party platform to pour meaning
into the liberal label, we would also expect that controversies
surrounding its proper use would not be settled easily.
Keeping in mind the conclusions drawn from this background
study of the liberal symbol in England, we can now turn to the
study of the symbol in the United States.
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The United States Backgroun.d
until1932

liberal for a few years, 3 for at this time period the term "liberal"
was insignificant as an American political symbol.

The Liberal Republicans, 1870-1872

Liberalism in the United States
1776-1870

I

As explained in Chapter 1, "liberal" did not become a viable or important political symbol in America until the
introduction of the New Deal. However, while the liberal label
was imported here without any historical connotations, 1 like a
courier without luggage, the term had still been used sporadically in the United States before 1932. This chapter analyzes
thes~ scattered uses of the term in order to determine why this
particular symbol was chosen at particular times in the past; why
the label did not become important in any of these past instances; and what-if any-general meaning was given to "liberal" in these past cases.
As noted in the previous chapter, "liberal" in a political sense
did not even appear in the English language until183o. When,
around 18oo, Hamilton advocated "a liberal construction of the
Constitution," 2 he was arguing for a loose or free construction;
that is, he used "liberal" in the grammatical sense, as an adjective, and did not imply that it represented a clear, or even a
vague, collection of political beliefs.
After 1830, in spite of the fact the British Tories had introduced "liberal" into the English language as a political symbol,
Americans still used the term sparingly and without any real
meaning. Some educated Americans, aware of politics abroad,
borrowed the term; but they used it not as an American political
label, but to identify their beliefs with those of Continental or
British liberals. This was why Orestes Brownson called himself a

The first and the only important national political movement before the New Deal that made definite and
continued use of the symbol "liberal" was the Liberal Republican party.
History does not remember Ulysses S. Grant as one of our
more adept presidents, for as his administration dragged on he
made more and more enemies among independents and within
the Republican ranks. In 1870 the disaffection with Grant and
his policies became so serious that a new party, the Liberal Republican party, was formed. There are two questions about the
Liberal Republican party that concern us: Why did it call itself
Liberal Republican? And why did the symbol and the movement
quickly pass into history? If we can understand what conditions
cause the symbol "liberal" to be quickly forgotten, then we will
have a better idea of what conditions must exist in order for the
label to become viable, lasting, and significant.
The Republicans who bolted their party adopted the label "liberal" largely, I believe, because of the influence of Carl Schurz.
By the middle of Grant's first term in office, there were pockets of
Republican unrest all over the country, but it was Schurz's Missouri that gave birth to the actual split in the party. It was in
Missouri, argues one student of the period, "that factional strife
led most directly to a national Liberal movement." 4 The two leaders of Liberal Republicanism in Missouri were B. Gratz Brown 5
and Carl Schurz, an "efficient champion of the cause." 6
It is easy enough to understand why Schurz and his followers called themselves Liberal Republicans. Although Schurz disagreed with many Republican policies, he had hoped to prevent
a break with the administration. 7 For example, in the Missouri
political campaign of 1870, an address written by Schurz characterized his faction as the "true Republican party" of Missouri.
Schurz apparently considered himself a Republican, but Presi-
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dent Grant "could see nothing but party treason in the ,.,,r.""-of the Liberals." 8
Why the Schurz faction called itself Liberal Republican is a
more difficult question. The group could have continued to call
themselves "true Republicans"; in fact, a minor revolt of dissatisfied Republicans in Virginia in 1869 had called themselves the
"True Republicans" as the only party label. 9 Perhaps Schurz realized that it would have been a tactical error to adopt "True Re..
publican" as the only party label. "True Republican" is not that
easily distinguished from "Republican": "true" is not really
scriptive, and it does not sound like a party name. Such a name
would also have prompted much useless debate over who the
true Republicans were. The discussion of real issues would then
have been ignored.
The other label that presented itself to Schurz was "Liberal Republican." In Arkansas, also in 1869, a faction of the Republican
party that was later to become the basis of support for the national Liberal Republican party had taken the name Liberal Republican party. This Arkansas faction was composed of mem-:
bers of the legislature who were "'old Whigs and disaffected
Republicans." 110 Since the old American Whigs had borrowed
their label from Britain, it is not surprising that in later years
these Whigs would once again turn to Britain and borrow the
new label that many former British Whigs owned.
The "liberal" tag of the Arkansas faction must have immediately appealed to Schurz, a liberal German who was an active
participant in the revolution of 1848/49. This appeal was prob..
ably reinforced because Schurz identified his free trade position
with British Liberal party policy. Schurz was one of the leading
members of the American Free Trade League, formed in 1869 to
encourage tariff reduction. 11 Not only Schurz but also Missouri
Liberal Republicans in general favored free trade:
The action of the tariff seemed an especial challenge to
the reformers. The forcing out of David A. Wells, a conspicuous figure in the reform group, from the position of
special revenue agent was resented as a victory for the protected interests in Congress. As a result the attacks on the
citadel of protection became more persistent than ever. In
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1870 the Free Trade League waged a most aggressive campaign. . . . The Liberal Republican campaign in Missouri
that fall was in part a free-trade demonstration. Governor
McClurg, the regular Republican candidate, was said to
have been one of the objectionable high tariff men marked
for defeat. Grosvenor, of the Missouri Democrat, was an ardent free-trader (the author of the League's publication,
"Does Protection Protect?"), and he put forward this issue
so prominently in the Liberal program that the New York
Tribune characterized the whole Missouri movement as a
free-trade conspiracy. 12
Schurz also may have taken on this label because he understood the favorable connotations of the word. Schurz certainly
used the symbol "liberal" as if he understood its power, for
in the election of 1870, the Missouri Liberal Republicans "issued
an address, written by Schurz, in which they unsparingly arraigned the Radicals [the Republican faction opposing the Liberals] for their illiberality, party trickery, and corruption in office;
and they claimed themselves to represent the true Republican
party of Missouri" (emphasis added). 13
Certainly no one likes to be attacked as illiberal, but those who
opposed the Liberal Republicans were, by implication and direct
charge, exactly that. We would expect that the Radical Republicans would object to being labeled illiberal; in fact, when we examine the editorial pages of the New York Times in the days immediately preceding the election of 1872-the year of the first
and last Liberal Republican presidential campaign-we quickly
justify the reasonableness of our expectation.
In 1872 the Times was Republican and strongly supported
Grant for president. In accordance with this support, they conducted an unrestrained, vituperative attack against the Liberal
nominee, Horace Greeley. In the five-day period under study,
whenever the Times called the Greeley supporters "liberal," they
would very often place the word within quotation marks, implying that these "liberals" were not really liberal, that their label
was an improper designation. 14
The Times also tried to counteract the implication that the Liberal Republicans were a better type of Republicans: while the
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paper referred to the Greeley supporters as liberals eleven times
in this five-day period, they called them Liberal Republicans
only twice. Once they even called them Liberal Democrats! All in
all, the favorite method the Radical Republicans, whom the
paper favored, used to meet the challenge of their opponents'
adoption of a favorable symbol was to try to avoid using it and to
find another label. In the period under study, the Times called
their opponents liberal eleven times, while they associated them
in some way with Greeley (Greeleyites, Greeleyism, or Greelevites) twenty-six times. Since-as we shall soon see-the name
Greeley had some very unfavorable connotations, the Times
battled symbols with symbols.
We now come to the second question. Why did the Liberal Republican movement and the liberal symbol very quickly and unceremoniously fade into history? The first reason was that the
only common factor uniting all Liberal Republicans was their
universal hatred of Grant. 15 Although Schurz's belief in a free
trade policy, shared with the Missouri faction, was an important
factor in naming the movement, it was not an important factor in
determining who would compose the national party bolt. In
fact, Horace Greeley himself was a protectionist, 16 and his nomination served to alienate many of the more ardent free-traders.
A great weakness of the Liberal Republicans was that their different motives for bolting produced constant disagreements. The
former secretary of the Liberal Republican National Committee
complained a few days before the election of 1872:
Our party was made up of a "shake hands across the
chasm" of all the soreheads and disaffected elements of the
United States. It may be it would have taken superior generalship to have half the Secessionists, and Union Leaguers, and
Pro-slavery men, and Abolitionists, and new Nationalists
and States Righters, and Peace Democrats and War Democrats and Protectionists and Free-Traders, and Manufacturers, and Labor Reformers, and Woman's Righters, and Spiritualists and Internationals, and Catholics and the United
Sons of America into our party: but I think it could have
been done, as well as to have caught a part of the negro vote.
But it is too late now. The Woman's Righters, and Spiritual-
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ists, and "Reformers" of all grades and ideas are against us:
and even the Democrats won't vote the ticket. 17
Some people became Liberal Republicans because they disliked Grant's undignified style, his crude manners and inept
conduct, 18 while others opposed Grant's support of carpetbag
governments and favored a more conciliatory attitude toward the
South. Still others objected to Grant's slow action toward civilservice reform or (for various and not necessarily consistent reasons) dissented from Grant's currency and trade policies. 19 This
incoherence of the party toward currency and trade questions
has been called its greatest weakness. The Liberal Republicans
"held almost every economic view then in vogue. Some were
conservative and some radical, some for a high tariff, some for a
low, some were gold men and some were greenbackers. To complicate the confusion, a number of professional politicians who
were on the outs with Grant and had no interest in reform attached themselves to the party. With its only unifying factor
being opposition to Grant, the Liberal movement lacked a basis
for either success or permanence." 20
The other major reason for the failure of the Liberal Republicans was their nomination of Horace Greeley for the presidency
in 1872. The Liberals might have nominated Charles Francis
Adams or some respected leader, 21 but the managers of Greeley's
campaign, to the dismay of Schurz and other reformers, were
able to start a stampede at the convention for Greeley. 22 Greeley's
nomination was a tragic mistake. It was said of Greeley that "his
odd appearance-throat whiskers framing a pink face; white
overcoat and socks-his peculiar mannerisms, his advocacy
of queer causes, gave him the reputation, fatal in politics, of
being an eccentric. The object of cruel abuse in the campaign
of 1872, he wondered if he was running for the Presidency or
the penitentiary." 23 Given this portrait of the nominee, it is not
difficult to understand why the Times called its opponents not
liberals, but Greeleyites.
The party bolters of 1872 designated themselves as liberal
partly because the leaders, either by intuition or conscious plan,
grasped the advantage of being called liberal and partly because
their original leaders identified themselves to some extent with
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the Liberal party in England. However favorable this symbol
was, it was not powerful enough to compensate for a completely
disunited party led by a vilified eccentric. Given its inadequate
program and leader, the movement and its identifying symbol
never became viable. Grant won by a landslide over the Liberal
Republicans; Greeley carried only two southern states and four
border states, and against Grant's 186 electoral votes he won
only 62. 24 For many years afterward no important group would
choose to call itself liberal, because this label had become identified with such a losing cause.

Progressivism and the New Republic
The next important moment in the history of liberalism in the United States occurred in 1916. In order to understand the significance of this mom.ent, we should review the
relevant background.
Walter Weyl, Herbert Croly, and Walter Lippmann were three
intellectual fathers of the Progressive movement. They were
very close to Theodore Roosevelt. 25 When Roosevelt ran for the
presidency on the Bull Moose ticket in 1912, Weyl, Croly, and
Lippmann were his loyal supporters. After his defeat, Roosevelt
accepted the failure of the third-party movement, saying, "The
fight is over. We are beaten. There is only one thing to do and
that is to go back to the Republican party." 26 But Weyl, Croly, and
Lippmann, as they came together to form the New Republic, felt
that the new party could become permanent. 27 Croly, for example, wrote to Roosevelt, "Now that the first skirmish is over
and the long campaign begun, I feel that the moment has arrived
to consider the question of organizing the party on a permanent,·
democratic, and self-supporting basis." 28
The new magazine editors at first extolled Roosevelt's virtues,
but it became clear that Roosevelt would not be won over to the
New Republic's ideas. Yet the editors were not enamored of the incumbent president, Woodrow Wilson, either. "Their progressive
philosophy demanded a strong leader to promote democracy
and nationalism. But the New Republic had no leader." 29
For the election of 1916 the New Republic decided at first to sup-
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port the Republican nominee, Charles Evans Hughes/0 and defended him against the charge that a justice of the Supreme
Court should not run for president. But the magazine wanted a
strong leader, and it was not long before its editors criticized
Hughes's mildness. Their dissatisfaction with Hughes increased
by the end of July. 31
Meanwhile, Colonel Edward House and other supporters of
Wilson saw the advantage of winning Progressive votes. 32 Although by 1916 the New Republic's circulation was only about
24 ,ooo, it was quite influential, and its contributors and supporters included Charles Beard, Randolph Bourne, John Dewey,
Felix Frankfurter, Learned Hand, and George Santayana. "The
New Republic had already a name for itself among intellectuals,
and upon the intellectuals the independent and progressive vote
in part depended," says Charles Forcey. 33 Particularly on the East
Coast, the magazine was an element to consider.
Responding to this influence, Wilson began to adopt the policies of Roosevelt's New Nationalism. The first sign of this shift in
policy was Wilson's nomination of Louis Brandeis to the Supreme Court on January 28, which the New Republic heartily approved. Then Wilson supported the Hollis-Bulkley farm credits
bill; the New Republic had favored this measure since 1914- By the
autumn of 1916, Wilson's Democratic Congress had, in fact, enacted into law virtually every important plank of the New Nationalism of 1912, and by August the New Republic had cleariy
shifted to Wilson's support. 34
In July, while the New Republic still had some misgivings, the
magazine stated: "What liberals need to obtain from Mr. Wilson
is some assurance . . . that his later preference for a governing
government will not prove to be as fugitive as his earlier preference for doctrinaire freedom." Charles Forcey, an astute student
of this period, comments: "The use of the word 'liberals' in this
instance is the first the author has noted in the New Republic's
pages." 35 He has also observed:
Croly, Weyl, and Lippmann ... had betrayed a subtle
shift in their own thought even as they recited their misgivings. They were now talking about "liberal," not as
always before, "progressives." The shift in terms showed
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the strength of the lure of Wilson's power, but, to the subsequent confusion of American political thought, it also
marked the piracy of a word that belonged rightfully to the
Jeffersonians. By August, when Hughes made his acceptance speech, the editors could without blush complain that
the Republican had "not yet justified the faith of liberals."
"Liberals" now suited the New Republic men better than
"progressives," because the old name was redolent enough
of the Bull Moose to embarrass any rally around a new
leader. 36
Forcey argues that since the Jeffersonians believed in a limited
central government, it is only proper to call them liberal, but
"liberal" could "rightfully" belong to the Jeffersonians only if
words cannot change their meaning. But words do change their
meaning. As Justice Holmes acknowledged in 1918: "A word is
not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according
to the circumstances and the time in which it is used." 37
Around the turn of the century in the United States, "liberalism" probably implied Manchester economics. It is because of
this implication that one author has argued that Americans had
to use the term "progressive" to describe their reform movement. 38 In England, by 1916, Hob house's definition of the new
liberalism had clearly triumphed. To those Americans such as
Weyl, Croly, and Lippmann who were in touch with British politics, it was not strange to use the word "liberal" by 1916, because
that term no longer needed to have Manchester connotations.
Because the new tag was appropriate, and because the old term,
"progressive," was inappropriate due to its close association
with their former ally Roosevelt, it was natural for the New Republic editors to begin to use the new symbol. "Liberal" was a
good and unencumbered word.
President Wilson, of course, continued to refer to himself as
"progressive." However, Wilson and his associates (including,
presumably, Franklin D. Roosevelt) did read the New Republic.
By 1932 the columns of that magazine, but not yet the general
press, fully embraced the terminology of "liberal" and "conser-
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vative," giving those words much the meaning they later possessed under the New Deal and in succeeding years. 39

Liberalism in the United States,
1919-1932
Although the liberal symbol was not yet commonly used in political debate by the general press or by the
great majority of the people before 1932, certain left-wing political organizations began to adopt the new term with increasing
frequency. Why these organizations-which were very small,
generally very local in scope, and very uninfluential-chose to
identify themselves with liberalism is a question easier to ask
than to answer. Perhaps they identified themselves with Continental or British liberals, or they may have been influenced by
the New Republic's use of the term. Perhaps all of these groups,
which sought to increase their own liberty, called themselves liberal becausle they associated liberalism with liberty and freedom
from restraint.
The first time that the New York Times reported a political group
using the name "liberal" was in 1921. The Times announced that
the president of the Liberal League of Negro Americans urged
blacks in New York to arm themselves. 40 The insignificance of
this league is indicated by the fact that this first short announcement of its activities was also the last. The next year the Times
informed the voters, in two short notices, that the Massachusetts
Liberal Republican League opposed the reelection of Senator
Lodge. 41 The effectiveness of this organization is reflected in the
Times observation: "This move is of great surprise, but is not expected to hurt Senator Lodge, even though the League has conducted a vigorous campaign." 42 After November 1922, we hear
no more of this league.
Later the Times reported that yet another league, the Liberal
League of Mid-West Colleges, was planning a conference of students and workers "to take steps for the abolition of war." 43 This
group also was insignificant, for if the conference was ever held,
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it was not newsworthy enough to be reported. (And if it was
held, it quite obviously failed.)
In 1924 the Times indicated that a Liberal Immigration League
existed and that it advocated immigration from Europe "without
regard to number and independent of our immigrant population." 44 Three years later the Liberal Civic League of Massachusetts was briefly able to win news coverage when it presented a
petition to the Massachusetts legislature suggesting repeal of
the Prohibition amendment. 45
None of these leagues was significant, either individually or as
a group, but it is significant that left-wing organizations chose to
place the term "liberal" in their titles. It indicated that "liberal"
no longer had connotations of Manchester economics, not only
for the New Republic editors, but also for various reform groups.
While all of these leagues were quite local in scope, in the
years before 1932 there were two major attempts to form national
liberal parties. In terms of political activity, both were utter failures, although each reflected pockets of discontent with the political life in the 1920s and possibly made easier the realignment
of political forces during the 1930s.
The first group that tried to form a Liberal party called themselves the Forty-eighters. In 1919 this group formed the Committee of Forty-eight, which was to organize a Liberal party in order
"to avert on one hand the extremes of radicalism and on the
other the extremes of reaction." 46 The brief history of the Fortyeighters' attempts to form a new party reads something like a
comic opera. 47 By the middle of 1920, Non-Partisan League delegates from South Dakota broke from the Forty-eighters in favor
of the Labor party convention, soon after the Forty-eighters quit
the Farmer-Labor party. 48 Finally, while Robert LaFollette was
considering whether he would accept the nomination for president on the Liberal party ticket, there was a third bolt in the
party when Forty-eighters who opposed LaFollette's nomination
formed their own Liberal party. 49 This anti-LaFollette convention
held in Chicago drew only about fifty delegates, and they
expected that they would name no presidential ticket. Lester
Barlow, the leader of the World War Veterans who was notallowed to make an address to the convention, threatened to call
still another convention. He charged: "I have never seen so
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many nuts collected in Chicago as during the past few days." 5°
This third-party movement failed completely, and in 1924, when
LaFollette did run as a third-party candidate, he ran under the
Progressive label. 51
In 1930 the Times reported that a second group was attempting
to form a national liberal party. Samuel H. Church, president of
the Carnegie Institute, announced the "creation of a new political
party, to be known as the Liberal Party, whose chief aim would
be to divorce the government from every form of religious dictation and seeking the dissolution of every society which aims
to subordinate any part of the citizenship because of race or
creed." 52 Church added that he was very much against Prohibition and that the "noble experiment" should be repealed.
Church claimed that his proposal for a Liberal party was a great
success:
A new party-the Liberal Party-had been proposed,
and its reasons for being had been clearly demonstrated.
The men whose names had appeared in the discussion
received hundreds of telegrams and thousands of letters,
from every State in the Union, and virtually from every
town in every State. "We want the Liberal Party," they said.
"We need the Liberal Party. The soul has gone out of the
old parties. Liberty is dead. America is perishing. Go on!
The country is with you. God bless you!" These were the
things which the people were saying from their deepest
emotions. 53
The Times, in a more somber mood, reported the cold reception that Church received. A Pennsylvania representative, who
was leader of the wet bloc in Congress and who warned that the
Republican party would disappear if it continued to support
Prohibition, still opposed a Liberal party, and Senator Borah
commented, "Third parties, where do they go?" 54
The Times proposed two main reasons for the easy rejection of
this third-party movement, one focused on history and the other,
interestingly enough, on labels. First, reasoned the Times, politicians remembered that Teddy Roosevelt's and Robert LaFollette's
Progressive parties had failed; and second, politicians realized
that "their policies are better advanced by adhering to the old
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party names and party organizations, even when these politicians are opposed to everything that their party stands for." 55
Although liberalism did not yet have an important role in
American political debate, these two third-party attempts did
prepare the way for (and help cloud the meaning of) the new
symbol. The first group, the Forty-eighters, by calling themselves liberal, contributed to the confusion of that term. The
original Forty-eighters were a splinter group of expelled German
liberals who came to the United States and continued their
polemics against Catholic groups here. 56 The new Forty-eighters
were apparently their intellectual descendants. The greater part
of their membership, their secretary said, was from the business
and professional classes, 57 and they favored, among other things,
the reduction of the president's powers in foreign relations, reduction of the Supreme Court's power to declare laws unconstitutional, public ownership of the transportation system, and
"literal restoration of the constitutional rights of free press, freedom of speech, and public assemblage." 58
The meaning read into the word "liberal" by the actions of the
Forty-eighters was essentially different from the liberalism of
Church's party. Church's liberals were not intellectual descendants of expelled Germans but generally were Republican businessmen. Church himself was an active Republican, 59 and Pierre
DuPont, chairman of the executive committee of the Association
Against the Prohibition Amendment, endorsed Church's proposal for a new Liberal party. 60 Among the approximately one
hundred men at the meeting held in New York City during
which the proposal was made to create the Liberal party, there
were "captains of industry, railroad presidents, college teachers,
steamship officials, bankers, [and] merchants." 61 This Liberal
party platform, very unlike that of the Forty-eighters', placed
much emphasis on opposition to Prohibition, blue laws, and
"those egotistical bigots who leave their cheerless pulpits and go
to Washington and the State capitals to demand laws for controlling the conduct of their fellow men." 62 When one group of
Forty-eighters and another group of anti-Prohibition businessmen laid claim to the favorable symbol of liberalism, the net
effect was to help introduce and help obscure the meaning of
the word.
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One might expect that if "liberal" is a favorable political symbol,
and that if politicians realize the advantage of owning that symbol, then some people would object to the attempted expropriation of it by the organizations just discussed. The discussion that
one would expect to ensue would, of course, be on a small scale,
since these organizations were small and somewhat less than
significant. In fact, such a small debate did actually occur.
One of the foremost advocates of his type of liberalism was Dr.
Nicholas Murray Butler, president of Columbia University during the 1920s. It may not be easy to summarize his political philosophy in one paragraph, but I think it would be fair to argue
that many of Butler's beliefs would be considered conservative
today. Rexford Tugwell has called him a "paragon of reaction,"
and a student under Murray's presidency reminisced:
The president of our university had forfeited our serious
attention when he annually affirmed his opposition to the
child-labor amendment. Moreover, we were always being reminded of his harshness toward such distinguished faculty
members as Beard, Dana and Cattell when they refused to
join the academic goose step in World War I. ...
He did have an extraordinary capacity for saying things
that invited derision. "Child labor does not exist in the
United States .... This is the undoubted fact despite the
quite irrelevant statistics marshalled in opposition to it,"
the papers quoted him as saying one day during state hearings on the child-labor amendment. On another day we
woke up to read that he had said, "Much of the talk of maldistribution of wealth is sheer invention ... mischievously
devised by radicals" and on still another he observed that
"capitalism is a debating term invented by Karl Marx." 63
But Butler considered himself to be a very good example of a
liberal. In 1923 he passionately felt that "liberalism is in eclipse in
the United States and throughout the greater part of the world,"
and complained that because liberalism was dying, it was possible for its enemies to struggle for its name: "There are those
who by striving to lay hands on the name of liberal and to apply
it to illiberal and anti-liberal doctrines of every sort have already
brought it into contempt, so that the followers of the great liber-

46 ·THE

POLITICS OF LANGUAGE

als in the history of the English-speaking peoples are confused
and ashamed .... Not a few liberals are discouraged, and what
wonder! They see their name stolen by their critics and their enemies because of its noble associations." 64
Although Butler never really made clear what he meant by liberalism, he did say that liberals are by necessity progressives and
cannot be reactionary because the powers and satisfaction of liberty never stand still. A progressive, he also added, is not one
who fixes prices by law, puts government chains on commerce
and industry, attempts to control the personal habits and conduct of men, or by law relieves any group of citizens from the
responsibility of paying taxes. 65
Two years later, in a symposium, "Liberalism: The Gospel of
the Open Mind," Butler no longer declared that liberals must be
progressive; liberals may occasionally be conservative, or even
radicat depending on changing conditions, he argued. The essence of liberalism now was not progressivism but "the holding
fast to [the liberal's] faith and liberty/' since the "true liberal is a
believer in liberty, whether that liberty be intellectuat civic, political, economic, or religious." 66
Dr. E. Martin Hopkins, president of Dartmouth College,
seemed to agree with Butler that left-wing elements were stealing the word "liberal." In his opening address to the two thousand students of Dartmouth in 1923 he warned: "We have ... at
the present time . . . extremists who style themselves 'liberal/
with a capital 'L/ . . . [who] exploit in their interests the field of
liberal thought. This professionalized group, arrogating to itself
all virtue and good intent and denying these qualities to all
others . . . is doing more to breed suspicion of true liberalism
than is being done or could be done by all available forms of
reaction if combined in militant array" (emphasis added). 67
Hopkins, like Butler, feared that the label of liberalism was
being stolen, but, unlike Butler's liberalism, Hopkins's was
narrowly defined as tolerance. It had significantly fewer economic implications.
William Allen White was a far different person from Butler. As
early as 1917, White argued for railroad nationalization, federal
old-age pensions, and public operation of the natural resources
"along socialistic lines." 68 Speaking at the same symposium at
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which Butler spoke, White did not noticeably differ in rhetoric
from Butler's vague brand of liberalism, saying, "I am a liberal. I
have always felt that God gave us a mind not to close but to open
to truth." 69 There is no evidence that White ever claimed in the
1920s that radical elements were stealing the title of liberal.
Alfred E. Smith had an even more amorphous concept of liberalism. At the same symposium with Butler and White,, Smith
told his audience that he believed in "the fostering of good-will
and tolerance." He also added optimistically, "Civilization is in
itself progressive and it cannot go forward without the liberals
who lead the way. It is an old accepted truism that the cranks of
one generation are the leaders of the next." 70
Several of these intellectuals thought that liberalism was being
exploited by left-wing groups, and although all of these men
had generally vague definitions of liberalism, they all thought
that liberalism was good and that they were liberals. In the entire
decade of the twenties there were apparently only two major figures who explicitly attacked liberalism. On the extreme right,
Mussolini denounced liberalism and parliamentarianism, 71 and
on 'the far left, the Socialist Norman Thomas, after differentiating liberalism as a doctrine of tolerance and liberalism as the
doctrine of laissez faire, claimed that laissez-faire liberalism had
"definitely collapsed." He added, "Much that passes for liberalism or progressivism, especially in the Middle West, was really
retrogressive." 72
In the few instances in which liberalism was discussed in the
1920s, all respectable public opinion leaders declared themselves
to be liberal. The propitiousness of the liberal symbol was probably increased by the fact that in this period of normalcy the only
significant people who attacked liberalism were a Fascist and
a Socialist. Both Mussolini and Thomas meant different things
by liberalism, of course, but they both attacked the same label.
This debate over the proper use of "liberalism" was very restrained, and most readers of the newspapers probably took
little notice of it, though the Times did write several editorials on
the subject. These editorials give the general impression of frustrated resignation. The Times objected to the more left-wing elements of society who proclaimed themselves to be liberal. Writing in an era in which people did not realize that many of these
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apparently extreme ideas would someday become commonplace, the Times argued that these left-wing elements would have
been more appropriately labeled "radical" or "red." However,
while objecting to the expropriation of "liberal" by the radicals,
the editorials seem resigned to new uses for the old label. While
the Times argued that the new liberals should be called radicals,
it appeared to accept calling them liberals.
In 1922, for example, the Times attacked those "self-styled
liberals" who cried, "'Liberalism' is in decay." These liberals
did not blame their doctrine, as they should have, said the
newspaper; instead, they claimed that the "fault lies with a
world turned suddenly narrow and reactionary." The editorial
recommended:
A manly candor would compel the self-styled liberals to
confess the tyranny of trade-union domination, the destructive blindness of "industrial democracy," and seek new
light, new leading. The lines of hopeful experiment are
striking out in many directions. Employe or "company"
unions contain the seed of truly representative institutions
in industry.... While attacking the most modern problems
of human welfare, the new liberalism is true to the spirit of
the Fathers-most of all in the fact that it looks steadily, courageously forward. But the professional liberals will have
nothing to do with it. They stand apart, with minds open at
both ends, wailing from time to time that liberalism is
in decay. 73
Although the editorial objected to these self-styled liberals,
and although it considered company-union liberalism to be
a better liberalism, the editorial did continue to call its opponents liberals.
In 1923, an editorial referred to the formation of a Liberal
League and called its preliminary declaration of principles
"highly respectable." These principles included the halting of
the "tendency of Government interference in every domain of
life," the maintenance of individualism, and the. assertion of the
dght and duty of the people's representatives to vote according
to their judgment and conviction. The editorial approved of the
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principles but called then: conservati~e. "Persons who call themselves 'Liberals' at Washington and In the several states try to
quicken instead of halting Gove~n~~nt i~terference in e:ery domain of life. Government by maJonhes, If not outworn, IS a conservative principle." The editorial concluded: "The only trouble
with the Liberal League is its name. It might better frankly
call itself the Conservative League." 74 In another editorial, when
advocating the "waiting for proof of the new before abandoning the old," the Times bluntly called such scientific skepticism "conservative." 75
In 1924 the Times sadly argued that since the World War, "there
has ... been a change in names and labels. One such notable
change has been the expropriation of the time-honored word
'Liberal.'" Since the armistice, "in the newspaper headlines it
was merely a question of space whether something was Liberal,
Radical or Red." The editorial concluded with a hope that eventually "the Radical-Red school of thought might be compelled to
hand back the word 'Liberal' to its original owners." 76 The Times
objected but also resigned itself to the expropriation of that "timehonored word."
Six years later the Times repeated almost exactly this editorial
of 1924. Once again the editorial argued that since the war a
great amount of violence had been done to the "historic name"
of liberalism. Once again the editorial pointed out that for "several years after the Armistice it seemed to be entirely a matter of
headline space whether the police took cognizance of a Liberal
meeting, a Radical meeting or a Red meeting." 77 That practically
the same argument that had been presented in 1924 was presented again in 1930 shows the Times's continual recognition of
and resignation to the expropriation of the liberal symbol by a
number of left-wing elements.
In the 1920s Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler would never have surrendered the title "liberal" without a fight; yet the Times, perhaps reflecting and molding the views of its readers, was more
easily resigned to the new meaning of liberalism. Perhaps, unlike a skilled politician such as Butler, the Times did not realize
the irnportance of liberalism and the increased significance that
was being attached to the label.
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Since liberal was a vague but favorable symbol, and since this
symbol had not yet been widely used, it appears possible that
Herbert Hoover, given the national platform of an incumbent
president, might have been able to win designation as a liberal
before Roosevelt had a chance to introduce and popularize the
symbol for a wide audience. In fact, before 1932 Hoover did
claim that he was a liberal. In 1928, for example, he attacked-in
the name of liberalism-Governor Smith's advocacy of government intervention: "Every step of bureaucratizing of the business of our country poisons the very roots of liberalism-that is,
political equality, free speech, free assembly, free press, and
equality of opportunity." 78
However, before the New Deal, although Hoover occasionally
referred to himself as liberal, he did not make any intensive effort to capture the label-that is, to popularize it and give it meaning so that it referred solely to his philosophy. What little
evidence there is during this period indicates that Hoover both
recognized and accepted the fact that many elements that he
considered illiberal were calling themselves liberal. Hoover
argued:
It is these human rights and the success of government
which has maintained them that have stimulated the initiative and effort in each individual, the sum of which has
been the gigantic achievement of the nation ....
Never had these principles and ideals been assembled
elsewhere and combined in government. This is the Ameri-

can system.
We have lived and breathed it. We have seldom tried even
to name it. Perhaps we might well abandon efforts to define
it-for things of the spirit can be little defined. Some have
called it liberalism, but that term has become corrupted by
political use ....
Ours is a system unique with America-an expression
of the spirit and environment of our people-it is just
American. 79
When the newspapers reported the speech, liberalism was, of
course, unmentioned. A typical article could say only that
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Hoover supported the American system, something that could
not be defined. 80
Perhaps Hoover did not yet realize the advantage of being able
to apply the liberal label solely to his own philosophy. Another
possible, and I think very likely, explanation for Hoover's apparent resignation at this time is that "liberal," as explained in
Chapter 1, was not yet an in1portant political tag. The label existed, and intellectuals and major politicians were aware of it
and occasionally used it; however, the term had not yet become
an important symbol of common speech. Hence it would have
been unusual for Hoover to have placed great emphasis on it.
We have seen the circumstances under which the influential New
Republic looked to the British Liberal party and introduced the
term "liberal" into American politics. After this introduction,
several left-wing or protesting organizations adopted the term,
while people we would today call conservative objected to this
new American use of "liberal." The New York Times editorials
and President Hoover objected-but not strongly-to what they
thought was a misuse of a time-honored word. All of these
activities occurred, of course, on a very small scale and were the
preparation for the much more widespread discussion of liberalism in the 1930s.
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The Great Debate: 1932-1940

The Antagonists: Hoover and Roosevelt
Herbert Hoover was truly a great Progressive.
Though a registered Republican, he sent a campaign contribution to Theodore Roosevelt and publicly supported his Bull
Moose party in 1912. 1 During World War I Hoover began to earn
much respect from people such as Louis Brandeis and Woodrow
Wilson-first because of his aid to Americans stranded in Belgium, and then because of his administration of relief in that
country. By 1918, Hoover had made such a national reputation
as an effective war food administrator that his name had become
a household word. In 1920 Brandeis and the New Republic began
a Hoover-for-President campaign. 2 At this time Franklin D.
Roosevelt wrote of Hoover: "He is certainly a wo'nder, and I
wish that we could make him President of the United States.
There could be no better one." 3 During the 1920s, when the
country endured the administrations of Warren G. Harding and
Calvin Coolidge, and when progressivism had disappeared
from the White House and no longer had a majority in Congress, Hoover was considered one of the progressive champions
of the national government. 4
Yet Herbert Hoover had a tragic flaw. Hoover the great Progressive, the great engineer, and the great humanitarian was also
the great dogmatist. He had in his mind a very dear idea of what
progressivism was; to venture one step beyond that idea was to
him absolutely un-American. Hoover would use .federal governmental power in a negative manner-for example, traditional
trust-busting-but would be reluctant to use such government
power in a positive way-for example, to feed people. 5 In 1931

he declared that desperately poor people should be fed but that
this care was a voluntary and local responsibility, for "if we start
appropriations of this character we have not only impaired
something infinitely valuable in the life of the American people
but have struck at the roots of self-government." 6
Hoover practiced what he preached. During World War I he
had tried to run Wilson's Food Administration as far as possible
on a voluntary basis. 7 Later, while secretary of commerce, he
induced Harding to persuade the steel companies to grant
an eight-hour day. Notice that the steel companies granted the
eight-hour day; Hoover did not press for a law to regulate hours
but urged voluntary regulation. 8 Later, as secretary of commerce
under Coolidge, Hoover established some two thousand voluntary trade associations to aid small businesses-associations
that could in theory "establish codes of ethics, standardize production, establish efficiency, and make substantial savings." In
practice many members of the voluntary associations did not
abide by their rules, as Franklin D. Roosevelt, head of the American Construction Council, soon discovered. 9
Rexford Tugwell has succinctly summarized Hoover's personality: "Hoover was not an engineer at all in any factual sense,
but a man of principle. . . . There was almost no distinction, in
his mind, between federal relief for the unemployed, for instance, and Communism." 10
While Hoover was dogmatic, Roosevelt was flexible. For example, although Roosevelt believed in government economy so
strongly that he objected, while governor of New York, to even
such small expenses as per diem compensation to the Nassau
County mosquito extermination commission, and while he enthusiastically accepted the Democratic platform's economy plank
in 1932, 11 he also could argue in that year, "I believe that we are at
the threshold of a fundamental change in popular economic
thought .... The country needs and, unless I mistake its temper, the country demands bold, persistent experimentation ....
Above all, try something." 12
Both Hoover and Roosevelt imitated the methods that the Progressives had used to direct the economy in World War I, but
Roosevelt was not bound by Hoover's dogmas. Both Hoover and
Roosevelt were ready "to label these measures as voluntary-
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but in contrast to Hoover, ... [Roosevelt] was ready to put int
them in fact the teeth of compulsion. Voluntary methods ha~
not worked very well." 13
Roosevelt and Hoover each represented a major school of
thought in t~e 1_930~. Hoover and his followers objected strongly
to Roosevelt s v10lation of the dogma that it is wrong for government to act positively. 14 While Hoover was certainly no Herbert
Spencer, yet had the same fanatical zeal of a Spencer, he and his
followers argued that Roosevelt's program was a precursor to socialism, or even worse was socialism itself, masked under the
name of liberalism.
Rexford Tugwell observed that both Hoover and Roosevelt "regarded themselves as liberal capitalists, even if the Roosevelt
d~finition would have included planning and direction. They
differed on a question of instrumentalism-what was end and
what was means and what could therefore properly be manipulated and what had to be regarded as untouchable. If this seems
narrow ground for so epic a struggle it is nevertheless the
ground on which it is taking place. It was-and is-that kind of
struggle. And it is by no means yet settled." 15 In this chapter we
shall analyze a part of the struggle that for a great majority of
people is settled; that is, we shall examine Hoover's attempt to
"unmask" Roosevelt as a false liberal.

Roosevelt's Need for a Symbol
In order for President Roosevelt to engage effectively in "bold, persistent experimentation," he had to capture a
favorable symbol that would help to ward off expected attacks labeling his programs as "communistic" or "socialistic." Tugwell
pointed out that, in order to win support in their struggle
against change, reactionaries have to impute "to their opponents either rascality or non-conformance so that their own
moral superiority could be urged in indignant language." This
Roosevelt adviser then elaborated: "But, political machines being what they were, rascality was usually more available to
reformers .... Non-conformity was the great resource of the
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felt forced to join." 16 FDR's political sense was keen enough to
realize that in the United States the label "Red," or even "socialist," is the sign of opprobrium.
"Socialist" is such a reproachful term here because of what
Louis Hartz calls our liberal tradition. 17 Because there has never
been feudalism in America, no aristocracy has developed with
an ideology to support its privileges, and therefore, no Far Left
could develop in opposition. This Far Left, where it does develop, has to form a counterideology (in order to justify its position) that rests on fundamentals contradictory to those beliefs of
the aristocracy. In the United States both Toryism and socialism,
and the labels that represent these philosophies, are unnatural
and foreign. Applying America's liberal tradition to the New
Deal, Hartz observes: "Had Roosevelt said, 'we have to go
beyond Locke but not as far as Marx,' and had he translated
Locke into 'Americanism,' which was of course its meaning
here, he would have alienated many of his followers from him.
... 'Americanism' was gospel, the very thing which made socialism alien, and any conscious transgression of it . . . was
highly unpalatable." 18 Roosevelt therefore needed an appropriate symbol so that he would be able to justify his new policies in
terms other than socialism.
It also would have been advantageous for Roosevelt to capture
a favorable, "forward-looking" word as a means of counteracting
the wealth of conservative symbols that for years were being built
into society. Both Rexford Tugwell and Thurmond Arnold have
listed several"sacred words" that had been captured by the conservatives. "Individualism," Tugwell and Arnold believed, was
used by some as a justification for not caring for the indigent;
"independence" was taken to prevent union membership; and
"freedom and liberty" were twisted by some to mean that corporations were individuals that had to be protected at all costs.
I

•
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"Liberty of contract" meant that it was unconstitutional for Con-:
gress to enact a minimum wage for women and children working in Washington, D.C. 19
Roosevelt had to counteract these old sacred words partly
by redefining them and partly by introducing a new symbot
He had to understand the functions of symbols in order, in
Thurmond Arnold's words, to "make men as enthusiastic about
sensible things as they have been in the past about mad and destructive enterprises." It was not enough for the government
to aid the indigent, encourage union membership, or support
unemployment insurance-measures that could be justified
on pragmatic or humanitarian grounds. Roosevelt also had to
justify these measures on a symbolic level. As Arnold realized,
"the humanitarian values which [many of Roosevelt's measures]
represent, and which prevent us from abandoning them, . . .
[should be] tied up with . . . [a] theological structure which
gives us peace and certainty for the future." 20
The third major reason why it was particularly important for
Roosevelt to be identified with a term of favorable connotations
was that he could use that label to win electoral support outside
of the Democratic party. Roosevelt needed to introduce a political label that would allow voters to think in terms other than Republican or Democrat. By associating his policies with a word
such as "liberal," instead of "Democratic," a sympathetic Republican could more easily justify his vote for FOR because he could
mentally say to himself, "I am for Roosevelt, not because he is a
Democrat, but because he is a liberal." Roosevelt used the liberal
label to operate as cross-pressure against the significant factor of
party identification.
Roosevelt must have been acutely aware that his party was
in a distinct minority position. In 1920 the Democratic presidential ticket, with Roosevelt running as vice-president, had
won only 34.1 percent of the total vote. Four years later this figure dropped even lower, to 28.8 percent, and in 1928 the Democrats, although raising their total presidential vote, were still
soundly defeated and polled only 40.8 percent. 21 While all politicians generally appeal to voters outside their own party, it was
essential for Roosevelt to win many Republican votes.
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While Roosevelt was governor of New York, he explicitly ordered Samuel Rosenman, his speechwriter, never to attack Reublicans or even the Republican party, because this would alien~te the many Republicans whose votes he needed. Roosevelt,
who continued this policy throughout his career, explained to
Rosenman: "There are thousands of people who call themselves
Republicans who think as you and I do about government. They
are enrolled as Republicans because their families have been Republicans for generations .... So never attack the Republicans
or the Republican party, only the Republican leaders. Then any
Republican voter who hears it will say to himself: 'Well, he
doesn't mean me, I don't believe in the things Machold and
McGinnies and Knight and the other reactionaries up in Albany
believe in either."' 22
This policy of Roosevelt's assured that he would not automatically repel Republican votes; yet, to win elections he had to attract Republicans. The logical extension of FOR's policy, then,
would be to introduce a term that could identify his ideas on
government and still not be so attached to the Democratic party
that it could not be used to attract Republicans. Roosevelt understood this and stated explicitly:
I have always believed, and I have frequently stated, that
my own party can succeed at the polls so long as it continues to be the party of militant liberalism. . . . There is a
vast number of independent voters who are unwilling to become affiliated with either party, but whose social and political outlook is definitely liberal, and whose votes have
been cast for liberal candidates. On the other hand, millions
of enrolled Republican voters-affiliated under the conservative Republican leadership for one reason or anotherhave nevertheless consistently voted for the type of government and candidates who appear under the liberal banner. 23
President Roosevelt realized that in order to ward off more effectively the attacks that he was a "Red," to negate conservative
symbols, to make men and women enthusiastic about his programs, and to widen his basis of electoral support, he had to
capture a favorable political label.
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Inappropriate Symbols for
Roosevelt's Program
There were several possible terms with which
it would have been unfavorable for Roosevelt to identify. He
could have called himself a Socialist, but such a foreign tag
would have alienated many followers. "Democratic" was a possible label, but emphasis on this word would have made it
more difficult for him to attract much Republican support. "Social Democratic" had the disadvantage of both worlds, for it
sounded "faintly un-American" and also would not draw Republicans. 24
Roosevelt could have relied solely on the phrase "New Deal"
to identify his program, and in fact this term-to which Roosevelt attached no special significance when he introduced it in his
acceptance speech to the Democratic convention-did become
the hallmark of his program, even though it was the press, and
not FOR's premeditation, that endowed the phrase with importance. 25 The great advantage of "New Deal" was that, since it had
no historical definition, Roosevelt's actions would automatically
breathe into this pliable term its entire meaning. Yet this advantage was also a disadvantage; because the word was born with
no meaning of its own, either good or bad, it was less useful as a
means of counteracting conservative symbols and winning support from those who did not want to be so closely tied to his administration. For these reasons, it was to FOR's advantage not to
rely solely on the tag "New Deal" but also to introduce a symbol
that had inherently favorable connotations, even though such a
word might be more difficult to capture.
No doubt a label that was a prime contender was "progressive"; in fact, Rexford Tugwell, an adviser to Roosevelt, preferred this term because of his "not liking the English 'Liberal."' 26 However, the great disadvantage of identifying with
progressivism was that the term was not an empty enough word
to be in the public domain. That is, the word was closely identified with the Progressive movement led by many Republicans such as Theodore Roosevelt and Robert LaFollette. Even
Herbert Hoover was well known as the Great Progressive. Also,
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Roosevelt wanted to experiment, but "the economics of American progressives was anything but experimental." 27 Rather than
attempt to change the meaning of a well-used word and risk
the possibility of association with Hoover, it was much more
logical for Roosevelt to try to capture a term that was favorable
but not well used and that did not have any publicly agreedupon definition.

Roosevelt Chooses a Symbol
Roosevelt instinctively chose to capture "liberal"
and identify his programs with that term. We will never know
for certain exactly why he chose that particular label, but we can
make some reasonable guesses. Tugwell recalled once talking to
Roosevelt about the origin of his use of "liberal," but Roosevelt
did not answer him, though "he laughed and asked if it mattered." 28 Roosevelt probably did not answer because he had not
consciously chosen the liberal symbol, just as he had not consciously chosen the label "New Deal." Rather, as Raymond
Moley believes, "the use of the term at that time was not arrived
at with any premeditation or precision." Moley adds, "I speak
with some authority on this because I did assemble and direct
the group upon which Roosevelt depended for the development
of campaign policies in 1932 and I was very close to him in 1933
when the programs were being formulated and presented to
Congress." 29
It was not particularly surprising for Roosevelt to identify with
the word "liberal," for he must have been reading the New Republic and would have understood that magazine's use of "liberal" and "conservative." Further, he was probably aware that
several reformist elements of society had been using the term.
Roosevelt had been using the term before the New Deal, but
he had not made it his own. As early as 1919, at a banquet of
the Democratic National Committee, he spoke of "conservatism,
special privilege, partisanship, destruction on the one handliberalism, common-sense idealism, progress, on the other." 30
Yet he had not popularized this liberal-conservative dichotomy,
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for as late as 1931 we can find Roosevelt comparing and contrasting conservative politicians or ideas to Progressive (rather
than liberal) politicians or ideas. 31 Apparently it was not until
1932 that Roosevelt began to popularize the liberal-conservati
terminology.
Just as it was Roosevelt's style instinctively to understand the
need for a symbol that would allow him to engage in bold and
persistent experimentation, he probably also instinctively understood what I argued in Chapter 2-that "liberal" was an inherently favorable term for a politician to adopt, that this label
had laudatory implications, and that it captured the drift of modern history.
Probably the main reason why FOR chose "liberal" was that he
identified with the philosophy of the British Liberal party. We
have seen how both the Liberal Republicans of 1872 and the New
Republic of 1916 looked to England when they searched for a
political label. Roosevelt very likely followed this tradition. Dr.
Maley states that "perhaps it [liberal] was [used] because we felt
that the philosophy we were suggesting was rather close to that
of the Liberal Party in England-the party of Gladstone and
Lloyd George." 32
We have already seen how the Campbell-Bannerman and
Asquith governments in England provided models for some
New Deal legislation and that Keynes, during the time of the
New Deal, perceived the Liberal party to be the middle ground
for controlling and directing economic forces. Roosevelt and
many of his advisers also saw their philosophy as being the
middle way; they had the same perceptions as Keynes. 33
Roosevelt wanted the middle way, and he made clear that
to him "the middle course is, and I quote what I have said before, 'just a little bit left of center.'" 34 Like the Liberals of England, every member of the Brain Trust rejected laissez faire,
trust-busting, or socialism. Instead they favored various forms
of business-government cooperation and believed that no element in society should hold a preponderant power. 35
If we could imagine Roosevelt in England, .we could more
easily appreciate how similar his philosophy was to that of the
British Liberals. Louis Hartz asks,
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What would he have said had the American Socialist party
been the English Labor party . . . ? Obviously under such
circumstances Roosevelt would be speaking very strange
language indeed. He would be defending private property,
he would be assailing too much "bureaucracy," he would be
criticizing the utopian mood in politics. After pleading for
the TVA and the SEC and the HOLC, he would proceed. to
qualify his faith in the state by an attack on the larg~r radicalism which faced him to the left. In .other words, Instead
of being "radical," he would be half radical and half conservative, which is precisely the unfortunate position that the
Liberal reformers of Europe were compelled to occupy. Instead of enlisting the vigorous passions of youth, he might
easily be described as a tired man who could not make up
his mind; a liberal who tried to break with Adam Smith but
could not really do so. 36
1 am not contending that Roosevelt was directly influenced by
Keynes's perceptions of liberalism, for these two men really did
not even understand each other. 37 Yet both Keynes and Roosevelt
were free of a dogmatic belief that government cannot act in a
positive manner, and both perceived themselves as seeking a
solution to the Great Depression, a solution that they saw as
middle-of-the-road. Hence Maley's supposition-that in 1932 the
New Dealers felt their philosophy to be close to that of the Liberal party in England and therefore called themselves liberalsis logical and reasonable.
Instinctively, for FOR had good instincts, Roosevelt had seen
the need for an advantageous label and had chosen it; yet
this decision did not end the story of the term "liberal." Rexford
Tugwell was at least one Brain Truster who appreciated the problem: "In the transition from an old to a new progressivism . . .
great care had to be used .... To be progressive was respectable
enough; but the enemy's game was to prove that individual progressives were 'radicals.' Any wine therefore had to be put carefully into the old bottles and the size of the letters on the label
had to be increased in proportion to the dilution of the contents." 38 The struggle to capture the word "liberal" had begun.
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The Beginnings of the Debate:
1932-1933
From the very beginning of the New Deal, Roosevelt adopted the liberal tag. When accepting the Democratic
party's nomination for president, for example, he called that
party "the bearer of liberalism and of progress." 39 In his second
message to Congress, on March 10, 1933, in a speech written by
Moley, 4° FOR justified his request for powers to slash $5oo million from the budget by warning, "too often in recent history,
liberal governments have been wrecked on the rocks of loose
fiscal policy." 41
Americans were not really concerned with what Roosevelt was
calling himself at this time. This was the period, until June 15,
1933, in which the country was experiencing the frenzy and motion of the Hundred Days. The president could do no wrong.
In May 1933, Anne O'Hare McCormick reported the mood of
America: "Something far more positive than acquiescence vests
the President with the authority of a dictator. This authority is a
free gift, a sort of unanimous power of attorney.... Industry,
commerce, finance, labor, farmer and householder, state and
city-virtually abdicate in his favor." 42 Some of the president's
measures, even deflationary ones such as budget cuts, were not
questioned but were accepted as "surgical measures for chronic
tumors in the political and financial systems." 43
On the whole, as Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., says, "the feeling
of movement was irresistible," and there were few signs of protest. 44 The Des Moines Register was one of the rare harbingers of
later dissent. "The world today," its editorial argued, "does not
know what true liberalism as applied to conditions of now really
is." It continued: "In this country we are in the midst of the dizziest period as to that question that we have ever known. This
much is certainly true, that it is the Hoover type of mind that is
still standing in these times for the individualistic dogma that
was the fundamental of original liberalism, and that it is the
Roosevelt type of mind that is insisting on far-reaching measures
which are the reverse of individualism. Yet practically everybody, without dissent, rightly or wrongly, looks on Hoover as
the conservative and on Roosevelt as the liberal." 45
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Actually, not everyone did look on Roosevelt as the liberal; we
find that for the first time the issue of what liberalism really
meant became important enough that a reader of the New York
Times was prompted to write a letter to the editor concerning the
proper definition of liberalism. Roosevelt had wanted bold and
persistent experimentation, but it was in the name of liberalism
itself that the reader objected, categorically asserting that "the
liberal is not an experimenter." 46 For the most part, however, the
issue of what Roosevelt was doing to that grand old word "liberal" was being ignored, and even one major corporate business
magazine-probably not understanding what Roosevelt meant
or would mean by "liberalism" -proudly announced to its employees: "If you are lacking in confidence in our President's
understanding of the many problems that must be solved in
staying this drastic liquidation and bringing about definite and
wholesome improvement, read a book just published, Looking
Forward, by Franklin D. Roosevelt. The cover sheet carries the
following: 'We are about to enter upon a new period of liberalism and of sane reform in the United States .... As President
of the United States I shall do my utmost.'" 47
Willard Kiplinger, who wrote an influential business newsletter, argued that it was not until March 1, 1934, that business
reaction against Roosevelt became significant. 48 That this thunder on the right did not appear until1934 was of great advantage
to the New Deal, for it furnished a period of grace in which
Roosevelt's programs could be identified with liberalism unhampered by any serious challenge to the New Deal's power to define
this term.

The First Round of Debate:
The Election of 1934
Since 1934 was an election year, the attack by the
Right greatly increased in an attempt to convince the American
people that they (the Right) were the true liberals. It was in this
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year that a group of very conservative Democrats and so
members ~f big busine~s such as Alfred P. Sloan-"find:;
the. R~pu.bhca~ p~rty an Inadequate vehicle for the expression of
their Indignation -established the Liberty League to save th
country by launching a direct attack on the New Deal. The Lib~
erty Leaguers would have preferred a new McKinley to a New
Deal, and they probably would have preferred a new Mark
Hanna to either. 49 (Mark Hanna, the prominent nineteenthcentury captain of industry, Republican National Party chairman,. and political kingmake~, typified the turn-of-the-century
marnage between the Repubhcan party and big business.)
I am not really concerned with the activities of this group, because the league was so extremist and represented such a small
~~~t of public ~pinio~ that even Herbert Hoover refused to join
It. More~ver~ Its main emphasis in political debate, the symbol
upon which It focused, was not liberalism but the American
Constitution. As one member of the league's executive committee, speaking of the Constitution, contended: "I do not believe
that many issues could command more support or evoke more
enthu~iasm .among our people [than the Constitution] ....
The~e Is a m1ghty-though vague-affection for it. The people,
I beheve, need merely to be led and instructed." 51
A more important, and more interesting, attack came from the
less .extreme conservatives, led by Hoover. Hoover's The Challenge
~~ Lzbe:ty appeared in 1934 and, says Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.,
.pro~1ded a comprehensive statement of the conservative position. 52 Hoover claimed:
Liberalism holds that man is master of the state, not the
servant; that the sole purpose of the government is to nur~ure and assur~ thes~ liberties. All others insist that Liberty
1s not a God-giVen nght; that the state is the master of the
man ....
. On other occasions I have commented upon the pervers~on and assumption of the term "Liberalism" by the theo-

~~es of every ilk-whether National Regimentation, Fascism, Socialism, Communism, or what not. I have pointed
out that these philosophies are the very negation of American Liberalism.
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And I may add a word to that group of people in and out
of government who are playing with Socialist fire without
expecting it really to burn. The penetration of Socialist
methods even to a partial degree will demoralize the economic system, the legislative bodies, and in fact the whole
system of ordered Liberty.... In the United States the reaction from such chaos will not be more Socialism but will be
toward Fascism. 53
Hoover and his followers carried this argument to the people,
shouting that Roosevelt's policies were socialistic.
What was really liberalism? This question was actively discussed on a popular level by a great number of people. We saw in
the previous chapter that in 1924 and 1930 two Times editorials
argued that the time-honored word "liberal" had been expropriated after the war. For the third time the newspaper repeated
this argument, claiming, "The good old pre-war word, liberal,
standing for progress with order, was captured by a much
tougher crew after the armistice, so that Liberal, Radical and Red
became interchangeable." 54 For the first time the editorial provoked a response from the readership: "One reads that 'the
good old prewar word Liberal has been captured by a much
tougher crew.' Is this not an ungenerous characterization of such
men as Herbert Hoover and John W. Davis-about the only citizens nowadays who are willing to make public proclamation of
their liberalism?'' 55
Another disturbed reader quickly replied. His answer is worth
quoting in its entirety:
By what right and on what basis does Elmer Davis [the
author of the previous letter] speak of Herbert Hoover and
John W. Davis as "Liberals"? There is nothing in the known
policies and actions of these men that will in any sense justify the title .
The word "liberal" has been taken in vain by a great many
persons since the World War but surely it is vainest of all to
apply it to men whose points of view are out of accord with
that characteristic of liberal-mindedness.
The liberal attitude is certainly that of belief in the improvability of human situations by means of specific legisla-
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tion without being scared off by foolish and irrelevant cries
such as "regimentation" and "socialistic." The liberal is further willing to let the other fellow shoot off his mouth with
his political opinions. 56
Professor John Dewey, during a symposium entitled "The Future of Liberalism," added that those who oppose basic reform
are ub}'In d and stubborn reactionaries." 57 Yet the Times sarcasti-S
cally charged that "a 'Liberal' administration is one that comes
down with the cash. A 'liberal' is a patriot who wants all he can
get from 'liberal' Uncle Sam, turning his pockets and those of
the taxpayers inside out." 58 The debate was on.
Since Roosevelt and Hoover and their followers were all claiming to be liberals, there must have been great confusion. Samuel
Beer hypothesizes that to end this semantic problem the New
Deal liberals called their opponents "conservatives." 59 That
~ewey was trying to label the Hoover school of thought as reactionary and that the opponents of FDR complained that Hoover
was be~ng unjustly tagged as a conservative does support Beer's
reasoning. However, since Hoover did not readily accept the appellation of "conservative," and since the United States did not
have a Liberal party that had the right to define "liberal," the
confusion continued-as we shall see-for some time.
An article that appeared in the New York Times Magazine during this period probably reflected quite accurately the general
populace's confused notion of liberalism in the early 193os. It
could hardly have been written today. It was titled "Liberalism
Faces a World Challenge," and its author wasP. W. Wilson. 60
Wilson immediately presents the problem: America is confronted by a "sharp issue .... It is an issue that has been stated
in the plainest terms. According to Secretary Wallace, the nation
has to decide whether it will or will not surrender certain liberti~s of the people to economic necessity. In the Old World,
Liberalism has been largely abandoned. Has Liberalism become
impossible in the New World?"
. Wilson the~ notes that there had never been so "many organiz,~d expresswns of what was understood to be Liberalism" as
there were in 1934. In Geneva there was the League of Nations,
and "even in Asia we find parliaments." The number of schools
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had multiplied. This was the era of opportunity; yet somehow
"over much of the civilized world the very Liberalism which promoted our civilization should now be stamped out by the police
as an evil thing."
Liberalism apparently had triumphed and yet had not triumphed. Attempting to explain this paradox, Wilson says:
"Clearly we need to rid our minds of confusion and ask. ourselves what Liberalism really means." He claims that "Liberalism
is a charter of liberty for the individual" that applies to all governments of whatever form. This charter guarantees that there
are certain matters, such as those of conscience, "in which the
free citizen has the right and duty to be his own master." Wilson
seems to be arguing that liberalism means tolerance.
Then, while describing what wonders this doctrine of liberalism achieved in the past, Wilson gives us another definition: "It
was Liberalism that put through the great schemes of old age
pensions and national insurance against unemployment, sickness and maternity. It was Liberalism that threw open the universities of Oxford and Cambridge to all classes and races, that
carried the first and fundamental scheme of national education."
Liberalism now seems to mean state welfare activities. As if to
give justification to this interpretation, Wilson later says, "No
grievance need arise if the State extends its functions by undertaking responsibility in an elaborated community for the regular
supply of necessities like gas, water and electricity. It is not a
grievance that the State should supervise railways and banks in
so far as such supervision is necessary to safeguard the interest
of the public."
Liberalism now means much more than tolerance. Yet Wilson
contradicts himself when he explains what is the liberal economic philosophy:
In economics the teaching of Liberals has been no less
clear. They have accepted the dictum of Adam Smith that
the wealth of nations is interdependent; that commerce between nations is of general benefit to all and special benefits
to each ....
Deficits on budgets, fluctuations of currencies, repudiation of financial obligations-all these evidences of chaos
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would have been unthinkable to the great financiers in Britain: Pitt, Peet Gladstone and the rest, who, whatever may
have been their party label, applied Liberal ideas to the administration of the Exchequer.
In short, liberalism is tolerance and individualism, but it is
also a state administering welfare and regulating the business in
the public interest-and doing all of this under the rules of classical economics.
While presenting his definitions of liberalism, Wilson also
classified several people as liberal. One might guess that such a
list would lessen the confusion over the meaning of liberalism.
In fact, the opposite effect is achieved. Wilson classifies John
Stuart Mill as a liberal, and somehow Thomas Carlyle-who attacked Mill, liberalism, and the greatest happiness principlealso qualifies as a liberal. We discover that Abraham Lincoln "became a symbol [of liberalism] for all mankind," and that Thomas
Jefferson was "perhaps the greatest Liberal of them all." Walt
Whitman, Charles Dickens, and several others are liberals, too.
What Wilson says in effect is that anyone who is well remembered was a liberal. His notion of who liberals are is as confused
as his notion of what liberalism is.
The American people on the whole were probably just as confused about the proper meaning of liberalism as was Wilson.
Roosevelt sensed their confusion and tried to persuade them
that positive government is not dictatorship. Minimizing the
differences with American tradition that the New Deal represented, Roosevelt pointed out that "the conservative British
press has told us with pardonable irony that much of our New
Deal program is only an attempt to catch up with English reforms that go back ten years or more."
Responding to Hoover's challenge, Roosevelt replied in kind:
"My friends, I still believe in ideals. I am not for a return to that
definition of liberty under which for many years a free people
were being gradually regimented into the service of the privileged few. I prefer and I am sure you prefer that broader definition of liberty under which we are moving forward to greater
freedom, to greater security for the average man than he has
ever known before in the history of America." 61

1 am certain that the great majority of Americans were still
confused; they would not have been able to agree on what true
liberalism actually was. Yet Roosevelt appeared to be taking
ositive action to fight the depression, and it was clear that free~om had not yet been subverted. "Most people simply could not
accept the portrait of the American government as a totalitarian
dictatorship," says Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. 62 In the midterm
elections, the Democrats did not lose seats, which would have
been normal in an off-year. Instead they gained ten seats each in
the House and Senate. 63
The debate was not yet over, but the New Dealers had won the
first round.

The Second Round: 1935-1936
From the very beginning of the New Deal, Roosevelt's policies differed from Hoover's and from those of the other
Progressives. Tugwell saw the New Deal policies as so dissimilar
that he concluded, "Looking back from the beginning of the
New Deal in 1933, the radical movements preceding it seem to
have been pretty mild, usually-deserving the name radical
only by courtesy, certainly not by comparison." 64 After the 1934
election, which inaugurated what was to be called the Second New Deal, it became even clearer to Americans that Roosevelt's policies were transcending much American tradition.
He was now beginning to give more emphasis to reform not only
to achieve economic recovery but also for its own sake. This
Second New Deal was far to the left of the First Hundred Days,
and it enabled Roosevelt to become the "champion of the
new political coalition of farmers, laborers, and millions of
underprivileged.'' 65
Although from the very beginning Roosevelt was doing something different in American politics, his divergence from past
policies became much more apparent to the articulate public in
general during this Second New Deal, for Roosevelt was responding with new proposals to a more class-oriented electorate. It was in this period, specifically in the 1935 session of Congress, says Raymond Maley, that Roosevelt powerfully urged
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"social security, aimed essentially at urban wage-earners; the
Holding Company Act, which undermined the strength of the
big power companies; and the Wagner Act, which put government squarely behind the labor movement. Roosevelt's major
messages and speeches took on a flavor of strong opposition to
business interests." 66
Tugwell has observed that Roosevelt's "departure from tradition followed practical necessities for some time before it became apparent that the design being created would have seemed
strange to Wilson or the predecessor Roosevelt." 67 Arthur Krock,
a discerning witness of this time, was one of the first to sense the
new design and to realize that the New Deal was shifting gears.
Commenting on Roosevelt's first appearance before Congress in
1935, Krock noted: "In his opening message this week to the
first Congress elected on a referendum of the New Deal-a Congress overwhelmingly pledged to support him and his maturing
policies-the President chartered a definite course for what may
in time be known as twentieth-century American liberalism" (emphasis added). 68 Krock predicted that Roosevelt's new policies might
capture the title of "liberal," and added that, in Washington at
least, the great majority of public thought favored the president
"not apparently or solely as Democrats or New Dealers ... but
as subscribers to his permanent character of liberalism. Responsible legislators and administrators in the mass seemed to find in
it no socialism."
Although Washington agreed that the new policies should be
called liberal, the rest of the country was not as convinced, for
Krock admitted: "Liberalism has never been defined to the complete satisfaction of any liberal." However, Krock tried to present the "correct" definition:
The Britannica gives what it considers the best definition,
and, if the President's message is examined in the light
of this description, it will be seen to reflect many of its
principles:
Liberalism is a belief in the value of human personality,
and a conviction that the source of progress lies in the
free exercise of individual energy; it produces an eagerness to emancipate all individuals or groups so that they
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may freely exercise their powers, so far as this can be
done without injury to others; and it therefore involves a
readiness to use the power of the State for the purposes
of creating the conditions within which individual energy can thrive, of preventing all abuses of power, of affording to every citizen the means of acquiring mastery
of his own capacities, and of establishing a real equality
of opportunity for all. These aims are compatible with
a very active policy of social reorganization, involving
a great enlargement of the functions of the State. They
are not compatible with socialism, which, strictly interpreted, would banish free individual initiative and
responsibility from the economic sphere.
While the comment can be made that one advanced section
of liberalism would oppose the limitations on individual acquisition
and power which the President pledged himself to impose,
another liberal group has always held that the State must, in
varying degree, protect the many weak from the full development of the economic and political strength of the strong.
This was the President's thesis and he fortified it with more
detail than he has ever given before [emphasis added]. 69
Krock, like Roosevelt, used the definition of liberalism as a
justification of the New Deal. Although he admitted that there
were. some who called themselves liberal and yet allowed unlimited individual acquisition and power, he dismissed them.
They refused to be dismissed, however, and for the 1936 election
they made a desperate effort to seize the label "liberal."
The Republican platform for the 1936 election, declaring that
"America was in peril," dedicated the party to "the preservation
of ... political liberty." Old-age annuities and unemployment
insurance were condemned as "unworkable," and Republicans
"pledged themselves to maintain the Constitution and to preserve free enterprise." 70 The presidential nominee who had to
face Roosevelt was Alfred Landon, governor of Kansas, who had
bolted the party in 1912 to support the Bull Moose Progressives.
But although Landon was the nominee, Hoover had hardly disappeared from the scene. It "was ex-President Hoover who in
speech and in writing attacked the procedures of the Democrats
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and formulated again and again the Republican case," says
Denis W. Brogan. 71
Representing the anti-New Deal position, Hoover told theRepublican party that it had had "the greatest responsibility" since
the days of Lincoln, for it had had to uphold "the standard of
American principle." There is "one issue that is never outworn,"
he argued. "That is human liberty. The party must become the
true liberal party of America." Hoover was specific in his attack.
"Today the term liberalism is claimed by every sect that would
limit human freedom and stagnate the human soul, whether
they be Fascists, Socialists or New Dealers." The New Deal, he
said, was a "false liberalism" that regimented men and extended
bureaucracy. He went on, "Liberty and opportunity do not
flourish on a deficit of three billions a year." 72
In another speech, in which he was introduced as "a real liberalist, not the anarchistic, communistic, socialistic type that
we have now," Hoover warned that the New Deal's ideas "are
dipped from cauldrons of European fascism or socialism." In
this speech Hoover suddenly changed topics and devoted most
of the remainder of his time to a discussion of the symbol "liberalism." He complained:
We hear much as to who is a Tory, a reactionary, a conservative, a liberal or a radical. ... You can elect yourself to
any one of these groups if you say it often enough. If you do
not like anybody you can consign him to the one which is
most hated by your listener.
Taking a compound of definitions coming out of Washington, the impression would be that ... the liberals have the
exclusive right to define the opinions of others ....
As a matter of serious fact, these terms have been used
mostly for camouflage and for political assassination. The
natural choice of youth is toward true liberalism ....
It is false liberalism that interprets itself into dictation
by government. 73
Roosevelt clearly understood that the Republican leaders had
decided to "base their campaign upon the charge that the New
Deal was an 'alien' form of philosophy," so FOR decided to
assault this issue frontally. Therefore, in his very first speech of
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the campaign he assured the people: "I have not sought, I do
not seek, I repudiate the support of any advocate of communism
or of any other alien 'ism' which would by fair means or foul
change our American democracy. That is my position. It has always been my position. It always will be my position." 74
Roosevelt's supporters joined with him in defending the New
Deal in terms of the symbol "liberalism." John Dewey, fm; example, wrote a historical summary of liberalism, contending
that liberalism had two strains: humanitarianism and laissez
faire. In the United States, he argued, "liberalism has been identified largely with the ideal of the use of governmental agencies
to remedy evils from which the less-fortunate classes suffer." He
charged Hoover and the Liberty League with "identifying the
meaning of liberty and rugged individualism with the maintenance of the system under which they prospered." Dewey concluded, as had Roosevelt, that "laissez-faire liberalism is played
out," but the remedy for a better society is not violence but
rather liberalism, which is not afraid to use state action. 75 Even
the New York Times, which earlier had been lamenting the loss of
that word, now published an editorial that differentiated between liberals and Communists, even though it said that many
liberals look "forward ultimately to a classless society, democratically controlled, in which collectivism coexists with full liberty for the individual." 76
Although Hoover continually insisted that he was the true liberal, the 1936 election offered the first instances of some Hooverlike liberals who began to call themselves conservatives. In replying to Dewey's defense of liberalism, one reader insisted-as
we would expect-that "true liberals" are "vehemently opposed
to government control of daily affairs of citizens" and that no
new legislation is needed. However, he also added that "true liberalism and conservatism merge." 77
We are told in another article that "your true liberal may be
toward many ideas and ideals most conservative, but he ...
presses on. With him there are imperishable values in history
and experience which no age can afford to ignore." 78 Except
for diehards such as Hoover, some conservatives in 1936 were beginning to abandon the liberal symbol and claim the conservative label.
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In 1936 the people had to decide if Roosevelt's policies meant
greater liberty or tyranny. The design of his policies was then
much clearer than in 1934. Roosevelt, of course, won every state
but Maine and Vermont. Unlike the 1932 election, in which
people of all classes deserted the Republican banner, the New
Deal in 1936 won "each successively lower-income group ... in
larger proportions.'' 79
We saw in Chapter 2 how the advanced Whigs captured the
tag "liberal" and were able to make it viable and lasting because
their name change was accompanied by a fundamental change
in policies and the introduction of class politics. For somewhat
similar reasons, although the dichotomies of America are more
moderate than those of England, the New Deal won the battle for
the word ''liberal.''
As it became clearer that the New Deal was going beyond
American tradition, it became logical to apply a new name to
those new policies. The new name was "liberal" and not "Socialist," partly because Roosevelt's political instinct rejected the
Socialist label and instructed him to insist that he was a liberal,
operating under a definition of liberty that allowed positive
government action, and partly because the Hoover school of
thought was insisting that socialism meant regimentation and
tyranny. Since the great majority of people had not felt ·any great
loss of freedom, they would not, by Hoover's definition, equate
socialism with the New Deal.
·
Before 1932 most people had not been calling Hoover liberal,
for he was a Progressive. Since his policies had not changed, it
was unreasonable for people to give him the new label. By 1936
most people probably also agreed that Hoover was not liberal.
Raymond Maley summarized the process by which "liberal"
came to identify Roosevelt's proposals. It was in the Second New
Deal, he said, that "the trade name 'Democratic' was kept, but
the substance of the party's heritage ... [underwent] a metamorphosis. And with the change there came into use the word
'liberal' to describe an ideology based on the enlargement of the
power of the Federal government and an abundance of welfare
programs." 80
The debate to capture the liberal symbol logically should have
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ended with the 1936 election; in the next section we shall see
why it actually continued.

The Third Round:
The Court-Packing Plan
The 1936 election results were fairly convincing
evidence that the great majority of people accepted FOR's new
policies and the new name he applied to them. Conservative Republicans should have realized the futility of their insistence that
they (the conservatives) were the true liberals. Indeed, the debate might have ended except for Roosevelt's attempt to pack the
Supreme Court.
Because of the Court's many anti-New Deal judicial decisions,
and after FOR's tremendous vote of confidence, the president became determined to alter the Supreme Court. 81 On February 5,
1 937, he proposed that Congress give a Supreme Court justice or
lower federal court judge past the age of seventy six months in
which to retire. If the judge or justice failed to retire within the
appointed time, he could not be removed from the bench, because the Constitution grants lifetime tenure. But under FOR's
proposal, the president would be able to appoint an additional
judge or justice, who-in theory-would be younger and more
able to handle the judicial work load. The maximum number of
additional judges who could be appointed was fifty, and the
total maximum membership to which the Supreme Court could
be expanded would be fifteen, a maximum that would in fact be
reached, since six justices were then over seventy years old.
Roosevelt would then have up to six new appointments on the
High Court. 82 Though Roosevelt presented the plan as a means
of getting new blood in the judiciary, the opposition and the
general public found this argument disingenuous and labeled
the proposal with the pejorative epithet, "Court-packing plan."
From the very beginning this plan ran into tremendous opposition from many congressmen, a great majority of the newspapers, and, of course, the American Bar Association, for the
Supreme Court was an important symbol in itself, a symbol of

76 • THE

POLITICS OF LANGUAGE

liberty in a world that was seeing Hitler's rise to power. The general public, who just a short time before had given the New Deal
a great margin of victory at the polls, also joined vigorously in
the opposition to the plan, for "through the years, and despite
increasing evidence that judicial interpretations and not Fundamental Law shackled the power to govern, the American people
had come to regard the Court as the symbol of their freedom."83
Most people know the end of this story: Roosevelt did not
pack the Court, and the Court stopped trying to repeal the New
Deal. 84 The significance of the episode in the liberal debate is that
because of this Court plan, conservatives could join with liberals
in attacking the proposal as illiberal. This was not the major
ground for the attack on the Court plan, but it was one basis.
Although liberalism was hardly the decisive factor in the Court
fight, the fight was a major factor in the debate over liberalism.
In the Senate, for example, the leader of the opposition to
Roosevelt's proposal was no conservative but the liberal Senator
Burton K. Wheeler, who justified his opposition in terms of liberalism. "A liberal cause was never won by stacking a deck of
cards, by stuffing a ballot box or packing a Court." 85 Since even
liberals were attacking Roosevelt in the name of liberalism, conservatives could make the same attack and once again claim that
they themselves were the true liberals.
Looking at the pages of the New York Times for this period, we
find that by far the greatest number of articles discussing liberalism appear to be in response to Roosevelt's Court proposal.
For example, the former secretary of state, Bainbridge Colby,
"warned against misuse of the term liberal." After presenting
the usual incantations such as, "Liberalism is the cooperation of
voluntary association, toryism is the cooperation of coercion,"
he became more specific and instructed that liberalism "involves
absolute independence of the judiciary. Toryism is the integration of power, and such a coercive regime seems the very antithesis of liberalism." 86 His implications must have been clear.
Later the Times printed a long editorial titled, "Liberalism and
Tempo." 87 The beginning of this editorial presented general attacks on the new liberals : "Liberals may defend a Klansman on
the Supreme Court [Hugo Black for a time had been a member of
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the KKK] because he is sound on the Administration's economic
program. The new Liberal will condone labor violence on the
ground that employers have long practiced violence in strikes,
and it is now our turn." That "fine old word 'liberal,' with a small
'1,'" said the editorial, has been "sometimes thrown out of the
window, by the Liberal with a capital 'L."' While liberals believed in moderation, "the new Liberal is in a hurry."
Given this introduction, the Times editorial then launched into
a strong attack, in the name of liberalism, on the Court-packing
proposal. Roosevelt's New Deal reforms were good, the article
said, but the true liberals would rather accept the delay of these
reforms than accept Roosevelt's plan for the Court. Because
of the Court, America might have lagged in social justice, but
the lag has not been a denial. Concluding, the Times warned:
"How dangerous anti-democratic speed may become has been
amply demonstrated in those countries where despotism presides over tempo."
This editorial, perhaps because it reflected contemporary public opinion so well, was greeted with a tremendous number of
responses. One reader warned that "the so-called new liberals"
are moving in a "blind rush." Another reader, agreeing with the
Supreme Court that many New Deal programs were "in violation of the accepted principles of government of the people,"
added that the Court proposal was a product of "self-conceived
'liberal' thought" that at the very least established a precedent
that provided "a grave fear of future danger." Another called the
editorial an excellent "example of liberal thinking," and yet
another observed: "Jefferson, truly liberal if ever man was, after
advising a correspondent in a letter of July 12, 1816, that although Constitutions should be amended when necessary,
added: 'I am certainly not an advocate for frequent and untried
changes in laws and Constitutions."' 88
Of course, not all the responses to the editorial were favorable.
Many of those who approved of the Court plan justified it in the
name of liberalism. Speaking of the same editorial, one reader
charged, "It is the old story of the laissez-faire school denouncing the fighters for social progress as radicals and revolutionaries." Another reasoned, "Liberalism was gradualist when the
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world was gradualist. Can it afford to take one step at a time
when progress, or at any rate change, on so many other fronts is
made by leaps and lurches? Isn't liberalism forced to quicken its
tempo if it is to survive at all?" Another simply suggested, ''For
the editorial 'Liberalism and Tempo' you should go straight to
bottomless perdition." 89
Since much of the public-liberals and conservatives-opposed the Court plan because it was not thought to be in the
spirit of liberalism, the debate over what should be called liberal
and if Roosevelt should really be called a liberal, was artificially
extended, even though Roosevelt had already logically captured
the term. However, although the Court proposal extended the
debate over "liberal," it also helped prepare the way for the acceptance of the label "conservative" by the conservatives. Because the Court plan to some extent discredited the New Deal in
the minds of many people, by association the Court plan also
tended to discredit New Deal liberalism. Since New Deal liberalism became suspect, the word "liberalism" became a little tarnished. It therefore became easier for conservatives to accept
another label that in their eyes was not tainted.

The Purge of 1938
In 1938 the president was stunned by reversals
in Congress, just two years after his overwhelming reelection.
What most exasperated the New Dealers was their belief that the
country was more liberal than the Congress, and that "many
Democrats had won office on Roosevelt's popularity only to knife
him as soon as the returns were counted." A council of liberals
was formed to study the possibility of purging conservatives
from the party. 90
On June 24, impatient with conservatives of his own party and
irritated by the election victory of Guy Gillette, a staunch antiNew Deal Senator from Iowa, Roosevelt began the purge. Against
his opponents he hurled a new (and yet old) symbol, when he
charged that they were "copperheads" : "Never in our lifetime
has such a concerted campaign of defeatism been thrown at

The Great Debate· 79

the heads of the President and Senators as in the case of this
seventy-fifth Congress. Never before have .we had so many
erheads-and you will remember that It was the copperS
. d h .
copP
heads who, in the days of the War between ~he tates, tr~e t eir
best to make Lincoln and his Congress give up the fight, let
the nation remain split in two and return to peace-peace at
any price."
Roosevelt then argued that, not as president, but as head of
the Democratic party, charged with carrying out its liberal platform, he had the right to speak in Democratic primaries ~etween
onservatives or liberals or in cases "involving a clear misuse of
c own name." Liberals, Roosevelt argued, recognize
. "h
t at t h e
Y
m
new conditions throughout the world call for new rem~ d'Ies, "
while conservatives "do not recognize the need to step In and
take action to meet these new problems. "91
Later Roosevelt went even further in his declaration and announced that he would prefer liberal Republicans to conservatives of his own party, and that he would continue to campaign for the election of liberals in national and state politics,
•
•
regardless of their party affiliations. 92
The manner in which symbols were used In the purge Illustrate both FDR's awareness of their importance and his opponents' increasing recognition of the power of words. After Roosevelt had tried to label all conservatives as "copperheads," the
Herald Tribune, a Republican paper, responded with the charge
that Roosevelt was pinning a new tag on his critics to "tar them
with utterly undeserved prejudice." Significantly, the paper then
queried, "Did the advocate of this technique, Mr. Thurmond
Arnold, suggest the use of 'Copperhead,' we wonder?" 93 Since
Arnold had written his own study of symbols, The Symbols of
Government, in 1935, and had been appointed assistant attorney
general in March 1938/4 the Tribune had good reason to wonder.
Rather than argue who were the "true copperheads," FOR's
conservative opponents, who by now had had several years
of experience in battling symbols, called Roosevelt's actions a
"purge." As William Leuchtenberg has pointed out, since the
word "purge" quickly became the generic term for Roosevelt's
actions, "the President [had] placed himself on what seemed the
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wrong side of a 'moral' question." The word "summoned up images of the bloody extermination of Roehm and other Nazi leaders by Hitler in 1934 ... [and] as the Czech crisis built toward
the showdown at Munich, it was easy to represent t'\.u,os4F>V&:•!V...,
move with the Saine unquenchable appetite for power that possessed the European dictators." 95 Although FOR objected to the
tag and argued that the word "purge" was used "by those who
were opposed to liberalism" in order "to misrepresent my
duct ... ," the label stuck. 96
Roosevelt campaigned for the election of liberals, but on the
whole the purge was considered a failure. Of all the races in
which he intervened, only in New York was the anti-New Deal
candidate defeated. 97
The purge failed for many reasons. For one, the New Deal's
prestige was falling because of the Court-packing plan, union
problems in 1937, and the Roosevelt recession in the fall of
1937. 98 The purge itself was also badly handled and "executed in
an amateurish and only half-committed fashion." 99 Probably another main reason for the failure was that Roosevelt assumed
that the country was much more ideological than it actually was.
Though New Deal politics were more class-oriented than previous American politics, and although "liberal" was a useful label
to justify actions and win support across party lines, Americans
still lived with the liberal tradition, where politics were not
solely class politics and ideological feelings were mild. As
William E. Leuchtenburg has observed:
Roosevelt had hoped that, by distinguishing between liberal and conservative representatives, he could win popular
support for the creation of a liberal Democratic party. Unhappily, ideological issues that seemed clear in Washington
blurred in South Carolina .... Liberalism and conservatism
became confused in an encounter which pitched the might
of the federal machine against the State House crowd, a contest in which each candidate sought to outdo the other in
whipping up race hatred. In the end, Smith [South Carolina's anti-New Deal candidate] won by splitting the vote of
the millhands. "It takes a long, long time," the President
commented wearily, "to bring the past up to the present." 100

The unsuccessful purge is useful not only to show ~he .limits ~f
ower of the symbol "liberal" but also because It gives evih
teP
dence
of a trend that began in 1936 but was b'fl.
ne y Interrupted'In
; that is, in 1938, often in response to the pur~e, we read that
1937
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sense." Elliott Roosevelt, who on some occasions had been
sharply critical of his father's programs, "defined the liberal. as
one who was ready to 'try anything once' and the conservative
as one who 'stops, looks and listens before he leaps."' One
reader attacked liberals by defining "a 'liberal' in Congress . . .
[as] one who is always liberal in spending the ~~xpayer's.money,"
while another defended conservatives by wnting that 1t was on
"the conservative American philosophy" that the foundation of
this nation was built. 102
More and more conservatives seemed no longer to be afraid of
calling themselves conservatives and attacking liberals. Even ~he
Des Moines Register, which was, as we saw earlier, one of the fust
newspapers to complain that it was improper to call FOR a
liberal, now happily accepted the new terminology and ho~ed
that America would enter into "another sober-conservative
period." One New York group, which was so reactionary :hat
it thought Dewey would turn the state to the Commumsts,
started a new party, and they did not hesitate to call it the Conservative party. 103
Just as 1936 marked the logical end of the debate, 1938 marked
II
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the beginning of the end of the actual debate. After this point
there was a precipitous decline in the number of news articles on
liberalism-not because people stopped using the term, but because it became less newsworthy. People were beginning to stop
debating about it, and more and more conservatives were ac.;
cepting the designation of conservative. 104

The End of Public Debate: 1939-1940
After 1938 the New Deal's interest turned much
more to foreign affairs than previously. Roosevelt was becoming
more concerned with the world crisis; as some historians have
noted, "he had not abandoned the New Deal, but it was in
abeyance." 105 As the president and the American people began
to think more of possible war, they talked less about the term
"liberal." In 1939 a headline announced that various Democratic
officials, including Paul McNutt, the Social Security administrator, and Aubrey Williams, the National Youth administrator,
predicted that liberalism would be the 1940 election issue; in
fact, the issue was national defense. 106
The issue of the proper ownership of liberalism was not
completely settled, though, for few issues are ever completely
settled. A poll taken in 1939 showed that "four out of ten voters
have little idea of how to define a 'liberal,' a 'conservative,' and a
'radical,' in spite of President Roosevelt's emphasis on the distinction."107 If we focus on the more articulate and well-read
public, however, on those who were more politically aware and
probably had some idea of what "liberal" meant, we should look
at the opinions of the 6o percent who could detlne the labels.
Only 1 percent of those who could give some definition of the
terms and who had opinions thought of Roosevelt as a conservative; 55 percent felt that he was a liberal, and 41 percent called
him a radical. (The poll indicated that most of those who called
him a radical were Republicans.) Only 5 percent of the people
who could give some definition of the terms and who had opiniori~s thought Hoover was a liberal; somehow, 3 percent said he
was a radical, although by far the great majority (92 percent)
called him a conservative.
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Roosevelt and a National
Liberal Party

Several students of the Roosevelt era have argued that FOR desired to realign American politics so that all
the conservatives would be in one party and all the liberals in
1
the other. The disastrous failure of the purge of 1938 clearly
showed that this realignment would not take place. "That man
Roosevelt" seemed to have learned his lesson after this debacle.
For example, in 1940 he refused a request to speak out on behalf
of Senator Harry Truman, who was opposed in the Missouri
primary. Stephen Early, the White House secretary, explained
to Truman that it was the president's "'invariable practice' to
take no part in primary campaigns. 'The President must stand
aloof,' said Early, 'regardless of any personal preference he
might have."' 2
Yet Samuel Rosenman contends that as late as 1944 Roosevelt
actually believed that "from the liberals of both parties Willkie
and I together can form a new, really liberal party in America." 3
Rosenman explains that after Dewey won the nomination in the
1944 convention, because of conservative Republican opposition
to Willkie, Willkie then discussed with Governor Pinchot the
possibility of the liberals in each party joining together and expelling all conservatives. Pinchot reported to Roosevelt, who
told Rosenman that he agreed with Willkie's idea "one hundred
percent and the time is now-right after the election. We ought
to have two real parties-one liberal and one conservative."
FOR then asked Rosenman to contact Willkie and discuss
the proposed new liberal party. However, since many Republican liberals had been urging Willkie to endorse Roosevelt, and
since Willkie had chosen to remain silent, the president warned
Rosenman to explain to Willkie that the meeting would have

thing to do with the 1944 election. Therefore Willkie would
no
f
. h.
not think the meeting was an effort or subter uge to w1n IS
support.
. . "
.
At the secret meeting Rosenman told Willkie, The President
learned in 1938, the hard way, that he cannot beat them [the conservatives] in their own districts. He is now ready to form a new
grouping, leaving them out of the ne:" liberal party. You see, you
both are thinking along the same hnes. He wants t~ team up
[with] you." Willkie agreed with Rosenman and smd that he
thought that the work should begin immediately after :he 1944
election. However, since Willkie died before the election a~~
FOR died shortly after, the "herculean task that these two pohticalleaders had thought of undertaking" was never even started.
That is Rosenman's argument; but the facts that he gives allow
a very different interpretation-that is, th~t Roosevelt.permitted
Willkie to believe he was willing to start a hberal party 1n order to
win, or imply that he had won, Willkie's support for the 1944
election. 4 This 1944 episode with Willkie was really Roosevelt's
last great use of the concept of liberal to bridge t~e gap caused by
party labels and to win, or at least app~ar to Win, the endorsement of a prominent Republican. Even If Roosevelt had no~ secured Willkie's official endorsement, he would have neutralized
his opposition during the 1944 election.
This episode with Willkie took place from June .to Aug~st,
shortly before the most active part of the campmgn ag~Inst
Dewey began. At this point Roosevelt looked old and hr~d,
while Dewey was young and energetic; in fact, "the campmgn
showed signs of being dull, and perhaps of ending in a Republican victory." 5 Roosevelt probably thought at this time that .he
needed all the aid he could possibly obtain. As one means of Increasing his support, FOR appealed to Willkie, not, of cours~, on
the basis of Republicanism or Democratism, but on the bas1s of
liberalism.
Rosenman explained that when he met with Willkie to discuss
the formation of a third party, Willkie said that he wanted to talk
about the plan in greater detail with the president, "but he was
convinced that the meeting should not take place until after election day. He did not want to appear that he was trading or ~eing
traded with; and a meeting between the two before election-
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which could not possibly be kept secret-would give rise to
many conjectures." 6 Rosenman relayed this information to
Roosevelt; yet the president wrote to Willkie, his former Republican opponent, that he wanted to meet with him before the
election. 7
This letter to Willkie was so secret that Rosenman says he did
not learn of it until a month later, and that probably no one except FDR and Grace Tully, who typed it, knew about it at the
time it was sent. Then Rosenman significantly adds: "On this
occasion, however, he could not keep the secret himself. He
must have talked to someone about the letter, for the fact that it
had been sent began to 'leak.' The Willkie adherents charged that
the President had deliberately let it leak; the President's supporters insinuated that Willkie had let it leak. Although Roosevelt
loved secrecy, he was often the one guilty of letting facts get out
about which he had sworn others to silence." 8
If Roosevelt really wanted to start a new party after the 194
4
election, we should ask, first, why would he insist on meeting
with Willkie before the election? Rosenman argued that possibly
the prospect of a new party was "too thrilling" to allow FDR to
wait, but he also admitted that "maybe his motive was-as his
hostile critics urged at the time-to give the impression that
Willkie was going to support him in the coming 1944 election." 9
Second, we should ask why Roosevelt allowed news of his proposed meeting with Willkie to leak. Rosenman guessed that the
news leak was due probably to "some casual remark" of the
president's. 10 I think the charge of the Willkie supporters, that
the news leak was deliberate, was possibly closer to the truth.
Roosevelt and Willkie never met before the election to discuss
the proposal for a new party. However, the attempt to win this
prominent Republican's support still partially succeeded. After
his sudden death, reports Denis W. Brogan, "some leading Willkieites did come out for the President; others went further and
declared that the dead leader had been planning to endorse
Roosevelt." 11
When the actual campaign began in September, the president
proved ~to be a strenuous and inexhaustible man, not a tired
old one. "This tour de force," says Frank Freidel, "seemingly
proving Roosevelt's capacity to serve four more years, his inter-
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national leadership, and his promise to return to the New Deal
after the war, were a winning combination." 12 When the results
were in, the Roosevelt magic had marshalled 432 electoral votes
to Dewey's 99· Although the belief by some that Willkie would
have endorsed Roosevelt did not become a crucial factor in
the election, the supposed endorsement did no doubt add to
Roosevelt's margin of victory; and, in the dark campaign days of
July and August, the winning of Willkie's support probably
seemed important to FDR. It was certainly important to Dewey,
who had felt, as the campaign reached its climax, that "a word
from Willkie ... [was] a boon greatly to be desired." 13
In a very subtle manner, Roosevelt had used the liberal label to
attract, or appear to attract, a prominent Republican who would
have been repelled by the term "Democratic." "Liberal," by
Roosevelt's definition, stood for a loose system of ideas that allowed some Republicans to justify their vote for a Democrat.
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The Epilogue to the
Great Debate

The Liberal Symbol after
the Roosevelt Era
. As we h~ve seen, although the political label
was Introduced Into England in 1830, the word was not
an Important political symbol in the United States until the time
?f the New Deal. The term had been used occasionally in AmerI~a before the New Deal, but it had not become a significant or
viable word for the great majority of the people.
. The New Republic did, however, begin using the word "liberal"
In 1916 .. In the later 1920s some left-wing, reformist elements on
the penphery of society also began to call themselves liberal.
Because of these influences, because "liberal" is an inherent!
good word_ that captures the drift of modern history, and als~
becau_se of Identification with the British Liberal party, FOR unconscwu_sly c~ose to call himself liberal. This political tag not
only fulfilled Important functions, but it was also the basis for a
great debate with the conservative elements of society, represented by I-Ierbert Hoover.
" .

h~eral

,

Although Hoover always claimed that he was the true liberal
by the 1936 election the articulate public generally probabl;
agreed-even though the debate over the term continued until
about 1940-that the new label "liberal" should be applied to
Roosevelt's new policies, which transcended much American
t:adition.' Since "liberal" had stood for Roosevelt's experimentaho,~, ~hich led to his entire philosophy of positive governmental action, that political tag is still a frequently used symbol
today· However, since "New Deal" has been associated, not with

Roosevelt's policies, but with Roosevelt's administration, that
term is no longer important.
Beginning in 1936, some conservatives admitted that Roosevelt
had captured "liberal," and they accepted the label of "conservative." The Court-packing plan of 1937 seemingly interrupted
this trend, but it actually helped its continuance, because the
Court proposal made New Deal liberalism even more suspect in
the eyes of conservatives. After the failure of the Court-packing
plan the trend resumed, and some conservatives began to ac\ept
more readily the name of "conservative."
By 1940, the actual debate was over for the great majority of
people. The articulate public in general agreed that Roosevelt's
policies should be called "liberal" and that Hoover's should
properly be labeled "conservative." But as the term "liberal" became more and more closely associated with the policies of the
New Deal and the Fair Deal, the political tag became less seductive; it lost some of its inherent power. As conservatives accepted
the fact that their opponents were named liberal, they reduced
their effort to win the word "liberal" and instead focused their
attacks on the substantive policies of the liberals.
Early in 1949, for example, the New York Herald Tribune asked
its readers to send in their own definitions of "liberal." Replies
ranged from "one who wants someone else to support him, to
think for him . . . to protect him from those who would impose
on him responsibilities," to "a liberal is a man who is constantly
and simultaneously being kicked in the teeth by the Commies
and in the pants by the National Association of Manufacturers."
Although the great majority still considered the term to be one
of honor, a few thought the .label to be degrading. 1 "Liberal,"
then, was on the whole still an advantageous word to own, but
the strong conservatives were able to reject what they felt was a
derogatory designation.
Later, when President Eisenhower assumed office, he continued this trend, for he "told us not to be afraid of the word
'conservative."' However, he still tried to mitigate the impact of
the symbol and conducted what James W. Prothro called an "incomplete search, despite the assistance of some of the country's
most efficient advertising. men, for an appropriate slogan to
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describe his public philosophy-with 'progressive moderation'
being replaced by the equally equivocal 'dynamic conservatism' [reflecting] ... at least an uneasiness about the appeal of
Hoover-style Republicanism." 2
Though conservatives during the Eisenhower years rejected
the term "liberal," they realized that the "conservative" tag then
lacked the inherent drawing power of "liberal." Even Barry
Goldwater, a man proud of his conservatism, revealed his frustration that conservatives were not called liberal. As late as 1963,
when addressing an enthusiastic audience of Young Republicans, he charged that "the young people of America are sick and
tired of the phoniness that has been going on under the false
guise of liberalism for the last thirty years." Later in this speech
he added, "Modern liberalism is only a form of rigor mortis. The
old, respectable, sometimes noble liberalism of fifty years ago is
gone for good." 3
Indeed, Hoover's definition of liberalism seemed gone for
good as far as the general public was concerned. The best the
conservatives could do was to try to popularize their tag. Eisenhower and especially Goldwater in effect tried to do this. The
business community represented by Fortune magazine also understood the need to breathe a better meaning into their "conservative" label. As one author realized:
One of the most important facts of life is that a rose by
another name does not smell as sweet. It is time to get our
labels clear.
To sum up: If "conservative" means a love of adventure, a
deep concern for opportunity, a recognition of the need for
tolerance and change, then I say, "If this be conservatismmake the most of it." But if "conservative" means a love of
routine, a love of status and security, a denial of opportunity, reverence for the status quo, then like the other "Virginian" I say, "When you call me that, smile!" 4
A clear sign that the general debate over the proper definition
of liberalism was muted, if not virtually dead, is that attacks on
the use of the word have been virtually ignored by the popular
press. For example, Robert A. Taft, in 1946, argued that he was
really liberal and that "self-styled liberals" advocated the con-
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tinuation of the Office of Price Administration, Truman's proposal for compulsory federal health insu.rance, an~ p.eacetime
conscription, which were "three essentially totahtanan measures." 5 Although a business newspaper proudly printed the
entire speech in which he presented his contentions, the general
public was not even stirred enough to ask, "Who is really liberal?" Several years later one conservative writer charged that the
word "liberal" no longer meant "a citizen who had a fixed and
shining ideal, a man of honor, a man of logic and clear thought,"
but now meant "a somewhat confused and craven creature who
spends most of his waking hours trying to 'see all sides of the
question' and ends up as a confused and ineffectual pulp, whose
6
greatest terror is of being called 'conservative."' The general
press also ignored that attack; it was no longer newsworthy.

The Rise of the Conservative Label
Today it seems that it is the liberals who are in
disarray, with the conservative political tag in the ascendancy,
along with current buzzwords such as supply-side economics,
flat-rate income tax, balanced budgets, and static revenues. How
did it come to be that a political label loaded with such favorable
connotations could suffer so dramatic a reversal in popularity?
The fashionable symbol today is not "liberal" but "conservative"
or "libertarian." The pendulum has certainly shifted, but why?
Roosevelt's capture of the liberal label has certainly been complete, but the victory has proven hollow. Why?
First, the symbol has become overused. As the breadth of its
coverage has increased, the depth of its power has lessened.
Like a currency that has become grossly inflated and diluted,
the liberal tag has lost much of its power as it has been used
to represent support of such widely divergent issues as minimum wage laws, government funding of abortions, and the end
of the prohibition of marijuana.
Second, Roosevelt's substantive liberal philosophy has essentially won. As the executive director of the Americans for
Democratic Act!on acknowledged a few years ago, "a substantial
number of people are really quite affluent now-economic is-
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sues don't impinge the way they did 20 or 30 years ago." The concerns today are not breadlines, sweatshops, unpaid vacations,
and excess profits. The focus is rather on bureaucracy, bloated
government, overregulation, and high taxes. Liberalism has
been one of the victims of its own success as the social agenda
has shifted. 7
In an article ominously entitled, "Update Liberalism, Or It's a
6o's Relic," the junior Democratic senator from Massachusetts,
Paul E. Tsongas, essentially agreed with the ADA evaluation:
Liberals must take a fresh look at how to mobilize this
new generation. The average young American takes for
granted the social equities for which others fought. Young
citizens have never known the abuses and injustices that
molded older generations of liberals. They have never felt
the anger and outrage that fueled the liberal cause. They
have not grown up reading about hungry poor people;
they have read about abuses in the food-stamp program.
They have not grown up confident in an ever-expanding
economy; they have seen sagging productivity, record interest rates, and foreign dominance in trade ranging from
crude oil to efficient cars. They may remember military adventurism in Vietnam, but they can read every day about
Soviet military adventurism in Afghanistan. 8
Senator Tsongas ·has been widely regarded as a liberal, with a
liberal voting record representing a liberal state. Yet he shifted
labels. At first he called his political beliefs the "new liberalism."
Then he called it "humane realism." Then he turned to "compassionate realism." 9 The important point is that the various proposed new labels drop the old label of liberal.
Strong evidence demonstrating that FDR's brand of liberal
politics has basically won is found in a wide variety of polls that
show that many people who now label themselves as conservative nonetheless favor government funding of abortions, federal efforts to provide Medicare and unemployment compensation, and federal regulation of employment safetyo 10 In 1964-the
year of Barry Goldwater's massive defeat at the polls-only 30
percent of the people called themselves "moderately conser-
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vative" or "very conservative." By 197S, 42 percent of the respondents put themselves in this category. 11 However, while the
number of self-described conservatives has risen, by 197S the
substantive economic differences between those described as
liberal versus those described as conservative seemed to have
diminished. For example, about 90 percent of the self-styled liberals believed that the government ought to help people get
medical care at low cost. But slightly more than So percent of the
self-styled conservatives agreed as well. About So percent of the
self-styled liberals and 70 percent of the self-styled conservatives
agreed that the government ought to see to it that everybody
who wants a job can get one. 12 Only on a very few social issues
was there sharp disagreement: about 65 percent of the selfstyled conservatives but only about 45 percent of the self-styled
liberals believed that the government should restrict the sale of
marijuana if the substance is dangerous. 13 Yesterday's battles become today's truisms, as traditional liberalism becomes a victim
of its own success.
Third, the national focus has shifted from the liberal label simply because it is natural for the focus to shift. The tide in the
affairs of humankind is not always high tide. As the historian
Robert McElvaine has noted, the country's political history has
been one of periods of liberal reform punctuated by what he
calls "conservative breathing spaces." 14 As the national focus
moved from Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty to the fight for a
balanced budget, there was a need to change the arsenal of labels to wage these very different political wars.
Human life seems to revolve around cycles-the twenty-fourhour day, the seven-day week, the four seasons, the twelvemonth year. Economics also has its cycles of boom and bust, inflation and recession.
And politics too has its cycles. After the excitement of the Progressives like Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson came the
normalcy of Coolidge and Harding. The New Deal of Roosevelt
and Truman preceded the calmer Eisenhower years. After the era
we now nostalgically remember as the 1950s came the elegance
of John Fitzgerald Kennedy and the excitement of Camelot.
Then came the Great Society and President Lyndon Johnson's
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crushing victory over the Republican standard-bearer, the proud
conservative, Barry Goldwater. Goldwater unashamedly embraced the conservative label, and Johnson tarred him with it. It
seemed as though liberalism had reached new pinnacles. And
so it had, but the next direction from a summit is down.
The horrors of the Vietnam War soon eclipsed the Great Society and gave liberalism a bad name. Well-known liberals such
as Hubert Humphrey and Lyndon Johnson embraced the war.
Even when other liberals such as Robert Kennedy and Eugene
McCarthy attacked it, those attacks also added some bad connotations to the liberal symbol, for some contemporaries labeled
these attacks as unpatriotic. And the efforts of the liberals to prevent escalation of the war were seen by some as efforts to have
the United States fight with one hand tied behind its back.
The Vietnam War continued under Richard Nixon. Nixon's
vice-president, Spiro T. Agnew, knew the importance of words.
Agnew spent a great deal of time trying to link "liberal" with
"radical." Nixon's second term not only brought more war and
Agnew's criminal indictment and resignation; it also brought
Watergate-that American drama that the late Senator Sam Ervin
thought was more tragic than even the Civil War, for the Civil
War saw acts of heroism, honor, and bravery on both sides, and
Watergate had no such redeeming features.
After Nixon's near-impeachment and actual resignation, our
country's first appointed president and vice-president took office. President Gerald Ford inherited unprecedented inflation,
recession, and energy shortages. Ford's successor, Jimmy Carter,
added to this triumvirate of problems the Iranian hostage crisis.
It was the winter of his discontent.
And then came the Great Communicator. Like Barry Goldwater, Ronald Reagan was not afraid to call himself conservative.
But unlike Goldwater, he spent no great effort seeking to dismantle the Tennessee Valley Authority. Rather than refight the
lost battles of the New Deal, Reagan unabashedly quoted FOR,
while fighting for his new conservative agenda, which included
Kennedy-style tax cuts.
This "inherent cyclical rhythm in our public affairs," as Arthur
M. Schlesinger, Jr., has said/ 5 is reflected in our current fashion
in labels. The fact that "conservative" is now a more fashionable
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word is strong evidence that President Reagan's election and decisive reelection victory were not merely personal victories but
portended possible fundamental changes in the political mood.
Republicans such as Representative Jack Kemp and Democrats
such as Senator Paul Tsongas have talked of such a realignment,
and recent polls lend some support to that view. 16
This cyclical rhythm is also reflected in the change in direction
of the New Republic. As the New Republic turned seventy in 1984,
President Reagan sent it words of praise, while Jeane Kirkpatrick
and Henry Kissinger joined in. Many well-known liberals, such
as Frank Mankiewicz, the former campaign manager for George
McGovern, acknowledge that the New Republic has been "getting conservative for some time, but now it's coming out of the
closet." And Republican Representative Jack Kemp agrees:
"There is no question that the New Republic is moving in the,
shall we say, right direction." Liberal columnist Nicholas Von
Hoffman bemoans the fact that "this society has no left-except
in baseball. It's very hard to go against fashion-even at the New
Republic." 17
The importance of the liberal label has lessened as the word
has been overused, as the traditional liberal policies have become truisms and liberalism has become a victim of its own success, and as the natural cyclical rhythm has progressed. There
has thus been a dramatic decline in the power of the liberal symbol. Yet it is a tribute to the potency of the liberal label that the
New Right, the proselytizing conservatives, often call themselves "libertarians." Both the Left and the Right find their roots
in the same symbol. And even today the liberal label occasionally
sparks a dispute for its ownership.

Lessons from History
Liberals had won their label, although time has
diminished the value of the victory. And conservatives, who initially merely accepted their appellation, now relish it. But before
this period, the battle over these symbols reflected and helped
mold the substantive policy disputes.
Roosevelt's adviser, Thurmond Arnold, recognized the sig-
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nificance of the battle over the ownership of symbols when
he noted:
The question which confronts the student of government
is what kind of social philosophy is required to make men
free to experiment-to give them an understanding of the
world, undistorted by the thick prismatic lenses of principles and ideals, and at the same time undamaged by the
disillusionment which comes from the abandonment of
ideals. How may we make the truths of which men are
dimly aware only in humorous or satirical moods into constructive forces to avoid senseless panic when old principles
meet new conditions? How may we affect the attitude of that
great mass of substantial, intelligent, idealistic, and kindly
people whose opinions and actions count most in times of
stability, so that they will cease to see impending moral
chaos in practical and humanitarian action? 18
Arnold's statement outlined Roosevelt's problem. The great majority of people had repudiated Hoover's policies in 1932; yet,
FDR still needed a new symbol to make his "bold, persistent
experimentation" acceptable. "Liberal" was the most appropriate symbol for Roosevelt's purposes and the one he unconsciously chose.
Reliance on the new label was an important means of warding
off strong charges from the Right that the New Deal was socialistic and that therefore Roosevelt was planning to regiment
society and nationalize industry. If FDR had accepted the designation of Socialist instead of capturing "liberal," he would
have lost many followers. The new and favorable term was also
an important means of counteracting conservative symbols and
of increasing Roosevelt's basis of electoral support. The sym-.
bol acted as a counterpressure to the symbol of Republican
party identification.
Yet, while this symbol performed these important functions, it
could not in itself be a substitute for good policies. "Liberal"
pt:oved ~o be a good label to place on the New Deal package, but
Roosevelt still had to prove that the package was worth buying.
The use of the label, however, did allow the public in general
to examine the New Deal's policies on its merits, "unencum-
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bered by constant thoughts of impending moral chaos." 19 Roosevelt's use of his political tag answered the questions that Arnold
had asked~
Several of Roosevelt's contemporary critics asserted that FDR's
capture of "liberal" was an important factor in his election victories. To be sure, "liberal" was an important and favorable political term, but it had its limits. The failure of the purge of 1938 was
one incident that clearly illustrated the limits of the power of the
word, for Roosevelt's label proved to be an insufficient basis on
which to realign American political parties. In modern times, as
the national mood has become more conservative, we can more
easily appreciate that the liberal label has lost much of its seductive power.
An appreciation of the origins and development of the political symbol "liberal" should also make us more cautious in applying modern labels, with all the verbal baggage that they carry,
as a means of trying to unqerstand and interpret the past.
Raymond Poincare, the president of France from 1913 to 1920,
had warned that "we have to make use of language, which is
made up necessarily of preconceived ideas. Such ideas unconsciously held are the most dangerous of all." And Bentham
added, "error is never so difficult to be destroyed as when it has
its roots in language." 20 Words not only reflect but also _determine people's thinking. Hence, we must be aware of the importance of words in order to consider their power to determine our
thoughts. For example, scholars have occasionally labeled a past
historical figure as liberal, and have erroneously assumed that
class-conscious electoral politics or similar aspects of the New
Deal would naturally be exported along with the political label.
As Thomas P. Neill has prudently warned: "Now an abstraction
like ["liberal"] creates difficulties for the historian. He is concerned with ideas as they are held by concrete persons at given
times and places in history. He must be careful not to read his
own or his age's understanding of a word back into the minds of
men using the same word three or four generations ago .... If
an historian were to do this he would fall into the trap of analyzing the wine in the bottles. He must also be careful not to transfer the contents of the term from one country to another." 21
I would add that, while scholars must be careful not to read
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a modern definition into the past's use of the word, they must
also exercise great care when reading a modern word and all that
it implies into a past that did not even use the word. Symbols
are not only the hidden persuaders; they can be the hidden
confusers.
Our study of the rise and decline of the liberal label should
demonstrate, in a very concrete way, the importance of symbols in law and government. There are limits to the power of
symbols. But there is also a magic in words: not the magic of
"abracadabra," but magic nonetheless. Words have the ability to
confuse and to clarify, to help legitimate policies, to generate
loyalty, to give the appearance of action, to mold people's perceptions of the world, to affect the way they approach a problem, and to reflect their innermost thoughts.
When people argue about "mere words," they are talking
about fundamentals, about infrastructure, not superstructure.
As the prophet John said, "In the Beginning was the Word."

Afterword: The Format of
Legal and Political Discourse
M. H. Hoeflich

Normativity and Instrumentalism
Several stimuli have sparked this essay and the
case study that precedes it. First, they have developed from a
close reading of H. L. A. Hart's now classic (and still controversial) The Concept of Law 1 and two brief commentaries on it, A.M.
Honore's "Real Laws" and R. S. Summers's "Naive Instrumentalism and the Law," both published in Professor Hart's festschrift,
Law, Morality, and Society. 2 After twenty-one years Professor
Hart's insights, expounded in The Concept of Law, remain fresh. It
is the great genius of this book that his insights into the "social
sources of law" are often not fully delineated and are even
ambiguous, for it is this lack of final resolution that makes the
book a starting point for discussion rather than the last word
on the subject. The second impetus for this essay is a growing
conviction that the economic approach to law, insofar as it points
out the necessity of considering the economic logic of legal rules
and doctrines, at least convinces us to focus upon issues such
as the social cost of alternative legal mechanisms, the allocation
of scarce societal resources, and indeed the efficiency of our
whole legal structure, which for too long have been ignored
by legal scholars. Third, it has grown from a reading of much
of the recent output of those scholars who are members of
the Critical Legal Studies Group and the attention they have
drawn to the necessity of using semiological, structuralist, and
other linguistic tools to understand law in its social context. 3 lt is
thus the purpose of this essay to attempt, in a small way, a cross-
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fertilization of analytic jurisprudence and legal economics on
the one hand, and analytic linguistics on the other, focused
on the forms of legal discourse and how these forms functio
within society.
n
Central to Professor Hart's idea of law is a rejection of the
Benthamite and Austinian notion that law, stripped to its bare
essent~als, is a series of commands, expressions of the will of a
sovereign, backed by the threat of sanctions. 4 Professor Hart
borrowing from the insights of modern sociologists, has re~
jected this simplistic definition of law and developed instead the
notion of law as a system of normative rules. 5 This notion of normativity is extraordinarily fruitful. Normativity is, above all, a
social concept. A rule is normative if it is one that a significant
portion of a populace believes to state and create an obligation to
behave in a certain way. 6 By "obligation" is meant that a significant part of society accepts that the rule ought to be obeyed
and that disobedience to the rule is ipso facto blameworthy and
therefore worthy of censure. 7 A normative rule will be the focus
of "serious social pressure" in favor of compliance. 8 Normativity
does not guarantee that a rule will be obeyed. Rather, it means
that members of the group for which the rule is normative
possess what Professor Hart has called "an internal point of
view" and can make comments upon the "internal aspect" of
normative rules. 9 Thus, although normativity does not guarantee compliance, it does signify that an individual violating a
normative rule would recognize that, in the eyes of society, his
act was wrong and blameworthy and that were he censured or
sanctioned, he would deserve it. Normative rules, therefore,
involve an internalization of a specific attitude inclining individuals to compliance and acceptance of situations where compliance, at least in the short run, may run counter to specific per~onal goals. Acceptance of normative rules may, in fact, require
Instances of renunciation or sacrifice or, in crude economic
terms, nonutility maximization over the short term. 10
The focus of this notion of normativity is society. Normativity
is a social fact, discoverable by an external observer. In this view
of law, normative rules may be seen as one interface between society and society's ideas of how it wishes to shape itself. The dis-
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covery of a society's normative rules will tell us much about that
society, how it functions, and how it sees itself.
It is clear that normativity may take a number of forms in
terms of obligation-creating statements. For instance, a rule may
be morally normative or it may be legally normative. Professor
Hart would make a distinction between these two types of normative rules based not on some difference in their "internal aspects," for there is none, but rather in their context. 11 He would
suggest that a rule is legally normative because of its "systematic" nature, its place within the union of different types of rules
that he labels primary and secondary. 12 It is this systematic aspect of some rules that leads Professor Hart to characterize them
as legal. This distinction and its focus on the systematic nature
of so-called legal rules has not been without its critics, but one
might suggest that this distinction is neither always clear, even if
it is fundamentally sound, nor necessarily significant. Many
rules may be normative in more than one way. Thus a rule might
be both morally normative and legally normative. Think, for instance, of the general social prohibition of father-daughter incest
in the United States. This prohibition is certainly legally normative, for it is a fundamental rule of criminal and family law
and an integral part of our legal system. But it is also certainly
morally normative, for even were there no legal prohibition
of father-daughter incest, there would remain "serious social
pressure" against such relations, springing from our common
Judaeo-Christian morality. Indeed, one might argue that the
particular strength of certain rules comes from their multiple
normativity. Thus, rules prohibiting father-daughter incest are
perhaps stronger in their social context than rules prohibiting
insider stock trading, although both rules are legally normative.
By "strength" I mean only the degree to which a sense of obligation attaches itself to a particular rule and the degree to which
deviation from a particular rule will be held blameworthy. The
stock trader may be sanctioned while the promoter of incest may
be shunned. So, too, perhaps, if public morality ever develops
strongly in a direction opposed to pollution of the environment,
environmental laws may gain in strength. The question would
seem to be one of degree.
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Having now arrived at this simple concept of legal normativity, we may now add the next element: instrumentalism, indeed what Professor Summers has called "naive instrumentalism."13 Instrumentalism is the doctrine that laws should be
oriented so as to achieve specific social goals. It is sociological
teleology. "Naive instrumentalism," as Professor Summers defines it, may be expressed as follows: "We have laws to serve social goals-communal functions. When officials set a goal and
pass a law, the idea [is] to achieve, more or less directly, a specific
end result (goal) by changing the behavior of people. The law
tells people what to do (provides guidance) and says what will
happen if they fail (usually some kind of punishment). Thus,
every effective law brings about social change. And it is officials
who make the law effective by enforcing it." 14
This definition of naive instrumentalism clearly will not do
if the purpose of the definition is to provide a complete description of law or legal system. However, the notion of naive instrumentalism can still be quite useful, for it does describe a particular approach to law and legal rules.
American legal historians have demonstrated during the past
decade that the attitudes of many American lawyers, legislators,
and judges toward the law were highly instrumental. 15 In broad
perspective, law was seen as a tool, a means, by which commerce, industry, and other commonly agreed-upon political and
social goals could be facilitated. 16 To a large degree, it would appear that these individuals' attitudes toward law in the nineteenth century could easily be characterized as naive instrumentalism. Again, in the twentieth century, those individuals who
used law in implementing the New Deal could easily be characterized as naive instrumentalists. For them law was a primary
means of effecting "social engineering." In short, one might suggest that a fundamental difference between the attitude of naive
instrumentalism and the more sophisticated and complex perspectives of modern legal philosophers is that the naive instrumentalist determines that law, in certain circumstances, may be
us:d as an instrument of social control, as a means of effecting
essentially political or economic ends. Obviously, this view of
law is rather far removed from notions of law either as a system
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of rules distinct from politics or morality or as a system of rules
designed to facilitate populist, libertarian, and individualistic
ends. Similarly, it seems at odds with any notion of law as a set
of normative rules. On the contrary, it is a view that opponents
might characterize as elitist. Nevertheless, it is a view that has
been held by many individuals both earlier in our history and
today. These people, the "educated laity," as Professor Summers
calls them, see law as a social and political tool. 17 This view, one
may argue, is one that is especially defensible today, on the
grounds that our nation is entering a period of social heterogeneity and breakdown of traditional order, thereby requiring a
reinforcement of "law and order." Indeed, one issue often taken
with the Hartian, sociological perspective is that it lacks direction or teleology. It is essentially neutral, removed from politics
and political goals.
The great difficulty with the naive instrumentalist view, however, is that it perceives law to be an instrument of hierarchy,
imposed upon a populace by its officials. Thus, naive instrumentalism hearkens back to the Benthamite and Austinian view
of law as commands issued by a sovereign and backed by sanctions. 18 One might suggest that this connection between the naive instrumentalist view and the Benthamite "sanction theory"
of law is not logically necessary or desirable, for the latter presupposes a legal system wherein the costs of enforcement in a
large, heterogeneous society may well be enormous and require
the establishment of a state enforcement system that itself requires a substantial portion of a society's resources. 19 In addition
to these potentially enormous economic costs, there are other
costs, such as the potential loss of individual privacy and the
breakdown in trust in the disinterestedness of governmental
and legal officials. The imposition of rules by authorities upon a
populace that has not internalized a sense of obligation to obey
such rules is economically and socially inefficient; if fear of sanctions is the sole or even primary motivation for obedience, then
this fear must be maintained. Maintenance of such a fear among
a large population is simply too costly in its use of resources. Put
differently, a system of imposed rules of behavior lacking the
backing of a serious social pressure toward obedience simply
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cannot be effectively maintained at an acceptable cost. Furthermore, .s~ch a system has echoes of totalitarianism and is likely to
be pohhcally unacceptable in so blatant a form.
To return to the nineteenth-century instrumentalist development of law for a moment, it is necessary to understand the reason why certain social groups were able to shape the law in
directions that facilitated those groups' nonlegal ends. One can
posit at least two possible scenarios. The first is that law was, in
fact, an instrument of repression used by the more powerful elements in society against other social groups that were incapable
of defending themselves or shaping the law to their different
ends. Certainly laws oriented to the detriment of minorities
such as blacks, would fit within this category. 20 Alternatively, on;
may see the instrumental nature of the substantive legal changes
as part of a broader package, including an ideology and framework that made it acceptable to most people, regardless of their
particular self-interest. In other words, one might suggest that
the nineteenth-century instrumentalists were successful politically because they were able to clothe their legal prog1·ams in
normativity, i.e., convince a substantial portion of the American
populace that their legal program was what it wanted.
It is at this point that we may return to the Hartian concept of
normativity for assistance. Professor Hart notes in his preface to
The Concept of Law that his study is one of legal sociology. The
description of normative rule statements that he develops is not
inductive; rather, it is empirical and based upon a close analysis
of common, everyday language. Ultimately, norms are not theoretical constructs. They are social facts. A normative rule statement is a verbal description of a social fact relating to accepted
modes of social behavior and social obligations. Thus, the notion of a normative rule statement is quite different from the
notion of a rule as defined by a sanction theorist. Of course, Professor Hart does not expect that all members of a society will
share the "internal point of view" necessary to the existence of a
valid norm in relation to all rule statements. Indeed, he avoids
this absurd proposition by building two qualities into his description of law: a systematic quality and a hierarchic quality. 21
He calls the systematic quality the "union of primary and secondary rules." 22 By this he means that a legal system will not
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consist solely of normative rule statements giving rise to obligations but will also contain other types of rules-what he calls
23
rules of recognition, change, and adjudication. It is these
rules-labeled "secondary" by Professor Hart-that give a systematic quality to law; they establish legal processes and procedures for legal creation and enforcement. The hierarchic quality
built into Professor Hart's theory of law derives from his belief
that a group smaller than the whole of society may, in fact, recognize the normative aspect of rule statements, w~ile th~ .remainder of society will obey such rules for fear of the 1mpos1hon
of sanctions or similar forms of compulsion. Professor Hart postulates an extreme case where only the "official" class in society
shares an internal point.of view towards rules, while all other
members obey for other reasons. In his view, such a system is
still a legal/normative system so long as the officials, those who
must create and enforce legal rules, regard such rules as norms.
In this extreme case, the normative rule statements are social
facts within this official class alone.
It becomes clear that in the extreme case the view of law in society espoused by Professor Hart begins to resemble the view of
law that we have attributed to a "sanction theorist." In Professor
Hart's extreme case, the official class faces the same dilemma in
regard to· enforcement costs and political resistance in a large
and heterogeneous society as would the sovereign in the view of
the sanction theorist. Professor Hart's theory of normativity,
however, if not pushed to the extreme case, may provide the
foundation for deriving a partial solution to the problem of enforcement costs and to creating a viable theory of legal instrumentalism. To the extent that a legal rule is normative-that is, it
is backed by serious social pressure and therefore exists as a social fact within a large segment of society-enforcement costs
borne by government (or the dominant social group promoting
the rule) ought to lessen substantially. They should do so because legal officials (the "sovereigns") cease to be the sole enforcers of the rules. If a normative rule exists within society, then by
definition, strong social pressure will be exerted by all members
of the society sharing the internal point of view as to that rule in
favor of obedience. Such pressure does not ensure that rules
will always be obeyed, but it does mean that most people will
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obey such rules most of the time, i.e., they will be law-abidin
Furthermore, there will be a large segment of society ready~·
discover deviations from the rule. To the extent that legal rule~
can be normative, one ought to see the phenomenon of a selfenforcement process, which will be less costly from an economic
perspective though perhaps not less intrusive from a priva
24
perspective. The legal system, as a result, will be able to ope?'ate more cost-effectively.
As already noted, however, normativity is a social fact, one
that arises within society. It cannot simply be imposed by governmental fiat. A sovereign or its agents cannot simply declare
that hencef~rth. a particular rule will be normative and seriously
expect that 1t will be so. Nevertheless, sovereigns and officialsthose having the power and authority to make and enforce
law-must recognize the cost efficiency of normative rules and
attempt to foster normativity and not depend solely on the fear
of sanctions and deterrence. This, we may suggest, can be accomplished in part by shaping the perception of particular substantive legal rules by members of a society through careful
attention to the forms of legal discourse and by adopting an
ideological and explanatory context for the rules designed to
make them more acceptable, thereby facilitating the process
of internalization. To return to the nineteenth century, one may
suggest that the precise reason why legal instrumentalism in
favor of commercial interests was so successful was because substantive law changes were presented within a particular style of
judicial reasoning, which has come to be known since Llewellyn
25
as "legal formalism." Substantive tort law changes were not
baldly pronounced as being for the benefit of the railroads, for
instance. Rather, the rules were "derived" from "established
26
doctrine." By this means, it became necessary for the populace
to internalize a belief in the inexorable logic and progress of the
law in order to give normative value to these substantive
changes.

The Modern Instrumentalist
The legal instrumentalist in the latter part of the
twentieth century faces a number of problems that our nine-
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those norms presupposes a society sharing at least certain fundamental ideas and premises. In the United States, for much of
this century, we have witnessed a growing cultural and social
heterogeneity as well as the disappearance of many fundamental, shared concepts. The agony of the Vietnam experience and
the disillusionment of Watergate and its aftermath have combined to shatter even the most basic concepts to which most
Americans might once have subscribed. Thus, there is some
question whether it is possible at all, in our current society,
to find a means of facilitating widespread internalization and
norm-creation. Professor Rotunda's study of the development
and use of the idea of liberalism in American political and legal
circles in the late nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth century is an attempt to explore this question.

Instrumentalism and the Study
of Political/Legal Terms
The text that precedes this essay contains a case
study of how one particular political/legal term became integral
to the American political tradition over time. Its importance lies
in two areas. First, it is an excellent attempt to examine how, over
the course of several centuries, the notions of "liberal" and
"liberalism" took on significant connotative values. Words, generally, may have both denotative and connotative values. Their
denotative values are their core meanings. Their connotative values are more complex. These are the images, the interconnections with other concepts, the subtleties and shades of meaning
a particular word may give rise to in the minds of a reader or
listener. Denotative values change slowly, if at all. Connotative
values, however, must be understood within particular sociohistorical contexts-must be seen, indeed, as outgrowths of
those contexts. The connotative values of a particular term are,
in this sense, normative and are observable social facts. Thus, on
one level, that of historical inquiry, the preceding case study of
the changes in the social meanings and impact of the terms "liberal" and "liberalism" is of great significance. It allows us to see
how a basic political/legal term has had varied connotations dur-
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ing different periods and in different societies, precisely in re28
sponse to those societies' normative beliefs. •
•
••
The second level on which this case study 1s of great significance relates to the first two parts of this essay. The notions of
"liberal" and "liberalism" are not clear-cut in our society. The
case study might easily have been subtitled "A Study in Ambiguity." Nevertheless, these terms have connotations that make
them fundamentally legitimizing for a significant part of the
American populace, just as does the term "conservative" for another part. Thus, to label a particular political or legal action as
liberal, regardless of the true substance of the action, will affect
how that action is received by different parts of society. To take
an illustrative example, let us suppose that the Supreme Court
keeps its promise and next year decides a case turning upon the
continued validity of the exclusionary rule. Let us also suppose
that the Court decides effectively to retain the exclusionary rule
in American jurisprudence. That retention will take place in the
form of a written opinion, or more likely several opinions. If, in
the course of writing such an opinion, the author uses liberal
phraseology and portrays the decision as one falling squarely
within the liberal American judicial and legal tradition, it seems
quite inevitable that the linguistic usages in the opinion will influence the public. Those who hold themselves to be liberals will
incline toward acceptance. Those who hold themselves opposed
to liberalism will incline toward rejection of the decision. Of
course, I do not suggest that labeling the act, in and of itself, will
legitimize it, but at the very least it will create a presumption of
legitimacy for those who support-indeed have internalizedthe label.
Thus, perhaps the core of the Professor Rotunda's study is its
examination of the way in which the modern notion of liberalism
was first developed and popularized in this country through the
writings of Harold Laski and the New Republic staff and how
Franklin Roosevelt, himself a consummate master of the political
arena, used this phrase to aid him in attempting precisely the
form of legal shaping so necessary to New Deal social engineering. By examining the degree of success or lack of it, one can
gain insight into how much the instrumentalist approach to law
can be aided through the use of a carefully chosen linguistic for-
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mat. Thus, the case study becomes, in fact, a historical testin
ground for the notion that th~ molding of an instrumentalist ap~
proach to law, what many might call even an activist approach
can be facilitated through careful shaping and presentation. '

Notes

Concluding Remarks
.
One of the most basic questions that even beginning law students always ask is why people obey the pronouncements of legislatures and courts. It is obvious, precisely from
the growing breakdown in overall respect for law in its various
forms, that this question cannot be answered simply by saying
that people obey because they fear sanctions. As noted, to maintain an adequate deterrence system is too costly, both economically and socially. A possible answer is, in the language of nineteenth-century contract lawyers, that people obey laws where
they have come to a meeting of the minds with the laws' promulgators, when they have internalized the laws to the point
that they have become normative. This study of political/legal
language and its use during one of the most legally activist
periods in American history helps us to understand how language can facilitate that internalization. Or to be quite blunt, as
merchandisers know, public acceptance of a product depends
as much on the packaging as on the product itself. For law,
the packaging is the language in which it is conceived, written,
and explained.
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